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WHERE OUR TAXES GO

LEAGUE OR WAR?

By

IRVING FISHER

PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS
IN YALE UNIVERSITY



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New York and London
1923

LEAGUE OR WAR?

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First Edition
O-X

TO THE MEMORY OF

MY DAUGHTER

MARGARET

ONE

OF THE MANY MILLION

RADIANT YOUNG SOULS

TORN FROM THIS EARTH

BY

THE WORLD WAR

PREFACE

This little book aims to review dispassionately the whole question of our American attitude toward world affairs following the World War, and to establish certain conclusions which all who are willing to face the facts can accept.

The United States seems, just now, ready once more to participate in world affairs, but is held back because of the endless variety of opinions as to what course to pursue.

In order to understand sympathetically every possible point of view I submitted the first draft of this book to a large number of critics—Republicans, Democrats, Independents, Pacifists, Militarists, Pro- and Anti-Leaguers, Pro- and Anti-Wilsonites, Pro- and Anti-German, French, English and Irish. Their comments have been of inestimable value. I wonder if so small a book ever before had so many helpful critics.

Among those to whom I am most indebted may be especially mentioned my wife, my brother, Herbert W. Fisher, my son Irving N. Fisher, and the following, most of whom are

authorities on the subjects on which they offered suggestions:

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Judge Edward Osgood Brown,
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IRVING FISHER.

New Haven, Conn.,
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LEAGUE OR WAR?

LEAGUE OR WAR

I. INTRODUCTION

PRESENT SITUATION

OVER four years have flown by since the Armistice; but America still remains without participation in any effective organization to prevent the recurrence of a world war.

We have not yet joined the existing League of Nations. We have not yet created the "Association of Nations" promised in the 1920 Republican platform. We are not yet officially represented in the Permanent Court of International Justice. Even the Hughes treaties negotiated at the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments are not yet in full force because not yet ratified by France and Italy.

This is surely a most remarkable situation, in view of the fact that the vast majority of the people of the United States earnestly desire peace and do not care whether the organization

for preserving peace is the existing League unimpaired, the existing League with the Senate Reservations, the Association of Nations, or anything else, provided only it be effective to keep the peace. Four years is a long time in which to do nothing but discuss what shall be done.

And while we are engaged in these lengthy discussions the embers of the World War have not yet been put out. On the contrary, they are lighting new fires, which already seriously threaten to spread into another world conflagration. Already these new fires have destroyed much of the economic power of Europe to buy our products as well as lessened the chance of America's being repaid the debts owed her by Europe.

These facts are now being realized, with the result that public opinion is turning away from the policy of isolation toward a vague idea of some participation in European problems. In short, Uncle Sam is fast making up his mind again to shake hands across the sea and is beginning to look shyly at that seat reserved for him at Geneva.

More and more people realize that, as Lord Bryce and Mr. Justice Clarke have said: "Civilization must destroy war, otherwise war will

destroy civilization." Is it not high time that this question of an effective mechanism to prevent or minimize war should be restudied earnestly and dispassionately?

No thorough student of modern history questions the necessity of some sort of world organization to keep the peace and promote human progress. The only important question is: When shall we be a part of such an organization? Must we wait until the question is again impressed upon us by another world war which shall throw us back into the Middle Ages, a war requiring centuries in which to recover, or perhaps destroying our civilization as completely as the ancient civilizations of Rome, Greece, or Egypt? Or can it come about in time to prevent such catastrophes?

EARLY GLIMPSES OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Such a peace league has been the dream of poets, philosophers, students and statesmen for many generations. William Penn wrote out a plan for perpetual peace; so did Immanuel Kant. The poet Tennyson, in "Locksley Hall," first published in 1842, foresaw, with the eyes of a seer, aerial warfare followed by a peace league:

"For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,
Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;
Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails,
Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales;
Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain'd a ghastly dew
From the nations' airy navies grappling in the central blue;
Far along the world-wide whisper of the south wind rushing warm,
With the standards of the peoples plunging thro' the thunder storm;
Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle-flags were furl'd
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.
There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,
And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law."

THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

In recent years many writers and philanthropists, notably Carnegie (in his rectorial address at St. Andrews University in 1906) advocated a League of Peace.

Chiefly through the initiative of Hamilton Holt, and with the coöperation of Theodore Marburg, later Minister to Belgium, President

Lowell of Harvard, ex-President Taft and others, a series of conferences were held in New York, beginning in 1914, shortly after the outbreak of the World War. As a result, a fairly definite plan for a league was evolved, much of which found permanent expression later in the League Covenant. With this tentative plan as a basis and ex-President Taft as its president, the League to Enforce Peace was formed in 1915. Since that time ex-President Taft more than once toured the country in behalf of the proposal. The League to Enforce Peace acquired many thousand enthusiastic members.

There was thus started in America, as similarly there was started in England and other European countries, a real educational movement toward a Peace League of Nations.

The idea of such a league of nations arose spontaneously in many minds and many countries. Among the prominent people who advocated it were Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman, Lord Bryce, W. B. Stead, Aneurin Williams, Mr. Norman Angell, José Ordonez, President of Uruguay, ex-President Roosevelt, President-Emeritus Eliot, General Nelson Miles, Senator Knox, Senator Lodge, Elihu Root, Richard Bartholdt, Joseph Choate, John W. Foster,

Edwin Mead, John Bassett Moore, Albert K. Smiley, Andrew D. White, Hayne Davis, Professor G. B. Adams, Dr. Frank Crane.

ROOSEVELT'S ATTITUDE

The most noteworthy among these personalities was ex-President Roosevelt, who had made his first argument for a League of Nations in his Nobel Peace Prize speech delivered May 5, 1910, and based, in part, on Hamilton Holt's editorial in *The Independent* published shortly before. Soon after the War broke out Roosevelt published his first article favoring a league. This was "The World War: Its Tragedies and Its Lessons," in *The Outlook,* September 9, 1914.

A few weeks later, in syndicated articles published in the New York *Times* and other papers on four successive Sundays (September 27, October 4, October 11, and October 18 of 1914), Roosevelt wrote most emphatically in favor of "A Great World League for the Peace of Righteousness." Some months later, January 4, 1915, he published an article in *The Independent* under the title "Utopia or Hell," a title suggested by the editor, Hamilton Holt, and meaning what the title of this book means —League or War. This article was repro-

duced in Roosevelt's book "America and the World War," 1915.

The following extracts from these articles will show ex-President Roosevelt's position:

"Finally, it would be a master stroke if those great Powers honestly bent on peace would form a League of Peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others.

"The combination might at first be only to secure peace within certain definite limits and certain definite conditions; but the ruler or statesman who should bring about such a combination would have earned his place in history for all time and his title to the gratitude of all mankind.[1]

"In view of what has occurred in this war, surely the time ought to be ripe for the nations to consider a great world agreement among all the civilized military powers *to back righteousness by force.* Such an agreement would establish an efficient World League for the Peace of Righteousness. Such an agreement could limit the amount to be spent on armaments.

"World peace will not come save in some such manner as that whereby we obtain peace within the borders of each nation; that is, by the creation of reasonably impartial judges and by putting an efficient police power—that is, by putting force in

[1] From The Nobel Peace Lecture on "International Peace," delivered Thursday, May 5, 1910, before the Noble Prize Committee in Christiania, Norway, printed in *The Independent,* Thursday, May 12, 1910.

efficient fashion—behind the decrees of the judges. At present each nation must, in the last resort, trust to its own strength if it is to preserve all that makes life worth living. At present this is imperative. This state of things can be abolished only when we put force, when we put the collective armed power of civilization behind some body which shall, with reasonable justice and equity, represent the collective determination of civilization to do what is right.[1]

"The nations should agree on certain rights that should not be questioned, such as their territorial integrity, . . . all should guarantee each of their number in the possession of these rights. All should agree that other matters at issue between any of them, or between any of them and any one of a number of specified outside civilized nations, should be submitted to the court as above constituted. They should furthermore agree not only to abide, each of them, by the decision of the court, but all of them to *unite with their military forces* to enforce the decree of the court as against any recalcitrant member. Under these circumstances, it would be possible to agree on a limitation of armaments that would be real and effective." [2]

Roosevelt saw clearly that without collective force there must be individual force and a competition in armaments. "This is the only alternative." He added:

[1] From "The World War: Its Tragedies and Its Lessons," *The Outlook*, September 9, 1914.

[2] From the newspaper articles, Sept.-Oct., 1914.

"Such a scheme as the one briefly outlined will not bring perfect justice any more than under municipal law we obtain perfect justice, but it will mark an immeasurable advance on anything now existing, for it will mean that at last a long stride has been taken in the effort to put the collective strength of civilized mankind behind the collective purposes of mankind to secure the peace of righteousness, the peace of justice among the nations of the earth."

Roosevelt was thoroughly in earnest in favor of a league of nations. He said:

"The horror of what has occurred in Europe, and which has drawn into the maelstrom of war large parts of Asia, Africa, Australasia, and even America, is altogether too great to permit us to rest supine without endeavoring to prevent its repetition. *We are not to be excused if we do not make a resolute and intelligent effort to devise some scheme which will minimize the chance for a recurrence of such horror in the future and which will at least limit and alleviate it if it should occur.* In other words, it is our duty to try to devise some efficient plan for securing the peace of righteousness throughout the world."

In view of later opposition to Article X, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the use of force, it is interesting to read Roosevelt's characteristic and vigorous championship of collective force:

"The futility of international agreements in great crises has come from the fact that force was not back of them. What is needed in international matters is to create a judge and then to put power back of the judge. The policeman must be put back of the judge in international law just as he is back of the judge in municipal law. The effective power of civilization must be put back of civilization's collective purpose to secure reasonable justice between nation and nation."

Again:

"My proposal is that the efficient civilized nations—those that are efficient in war as well as in peace—shall join in a world league for the peace of righteousness.

"This is to be accomplished by all the powers covenanting to put their whole strength back of the fulfillment of the treaty obligations, including the decrees of the court established under and in accordance with the treaty.

"They would lay down the rule that the territorial integrity of each nation was inviolate; that it was to be guaranteed absolutely its sovereign rights in certain particulars.

"Each nation should be guaranteed against having any of these specified rights infringed upon. They would not be made arbitrable, any more than an individual's right to life and limb is made arbitrable; they would be mutually guaranteed. All other matters that could arise between these nations should be settled by the international court.

"Then, and most important, the nations should

severally guarantee to use their entire military force, if necessary, against any nation which defied the decrees of the tribunal or which violated any of the rights which in the rules it was expressly stipulated should be reserved to the several nations, the rights to their territorial integrity and the like." [1]

ROOSEVELT AND "THE" LEAGUE

Roosevelt died on January 6, 1919, just as the problem of *the* League of Nations was coming forward. As is well known, he was a bitter opponent politically of Woodrow Wilson, but there is no shred of authentic evidence to show that he ever allowed partisanship to swerve him from his original position on the League. He never repudiated the articles quoted. On the contrary, we have decisive evidence that he retained these views to the end of his life. To show this, we may here anticipate our story and quote from three articles written after *the* League of Nations hove in sight but before it had been reduced to writing:

"Without question there is a general desire for some kind of international agreement or union or league which will tend to prevent the recurrence, or at least to minimize the scope and the horrors of such a hideous disaster to humanity as the world

[1] From "Utopia or Hell," *The Independent,* Monday, January 4, 1915.

war. In common with most of my friends, I strongly share this feeling; indeed, the scheme which still seems to me most likely to prove feasible and beneficial in action is that which I gave in outline four years ago in the little volume called 'America and the World War.'

"Let us go into such a league. But let us weigh well what we promise; and then train ourselves in body and soul to keep our promises. Let us treat the formation of the league as an addition to but in no sense as a substitute for preparing our own strength for our own defense. And let us build a genuine internationalism, that is, a genuine and generous regard for the rights of others, on the only healthy basis:—a sound and intense development of the broadest spirit of American nationalism." [1]

The last writing which can be quoted is from a posthumous editorial by Roosevelt, published in the Kansas City *Star* January 13, 1919. It was dictated January 3, 1919, only three days before his death. In it he said:

"We all of us earnestly desire such a league, only we wish to be sure that it will help and not hinder the cause of world peace and justice.

"Mr. Taft has recently defined the purposes of the League and the limitations under which it would act, in a way that enables most of us to say *we very heartily agree in principle with his theory and can, without doubt, come to an agreement on specific details.*

[1] From "The League of Nations," *The Metropolitan Magazine,* January, 1919.

"Let us at the peace table see that real justice is done as among these Allies, and that, while the sternest reparation is demanded from our foes for such horrors as those committed in Belgium, Northern France, Armenia, and the sinking of the Lusitania, nothing should be done in the spirit of mere vengeance. Then let us agree to extend the privileges of the League, as rapidly as their conduct warrants it, to other nations, doubtless discriminating between those who would have a guiding part in the League and the weak nations who would be entitled to the privileges of membership, but who would not be entitled to a guiding voice in the councils. Let each nation reserve to itself and for its own decision, and let it clearly set forth questions which are non-justiciable.

"Finally make it perfectly clear that we do not intend to take a position of international Meddlesome Matty. The American people do not wish to go into an overseas war unless for a very great cause and where the issue is absolutely plain. . . . Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce some kind of police system in the weak and disorderly countries at their thresholds.

"I believe that such an effort made moderately and sanely, but sincerely and with utter scorn for words that are not made good by deeds, will be productive of real and lasting international good."

As will be seen later, the very requirements here laid down by Roosevelt for an efficient league have been substantially incorporated in the existing League. It will therefore be evi-

dent how baseless is the assumption that Roosevelt would have opposed the League had he lived. Incidentally the reader will note that the impression created by irresponsible statements to the effect that Roosevelt did oppose the actual League Covenant (either in its preliminary or final form) was absolutely mistaken, for the simple reason that even the first draft of the League Covenant was not drawn until February 14, 1919, about six weeks after Roosevelt's death.

When Roosevelt dictated this last editorial, therefore, the League was only a project, not yet a reality. What the editorial said was simply that, with Taft, he approved of this project "in principle" and had no doubt that "the details" could be worked out to which he could agree. Inasmuch as the League Covenant, including Article X, is startlingly like Roosevelt's description of what it ought to be, we cannot escape the conclusion, however discordant with common impressions, that Roosevelt's farewell advice to this world was to carry out the project of the (not "a" this time but "the") League of Nations, to prevent a recurrence of world war. He had, thus, to the end, kept his picture of "Utopia or Hell" as the only two possible alternatives—League or War.

II. THE COMING OF "THE" LEAGUE

PRESIDENT WILSON'S ACTIVITIES

Up to 1916 few men in official life had, in any responsible way, advocated a league of nations. Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman, Prime Minister of England, in a speech in December, 1905, at Albert Hall, had advocated a League of Peace. Early in the War, Sir Edward Grey, now Viscount Grey of Fallodon, had made a somewhat timid suggestion to the effect that such a league might well be considered at the close of the War though it might be too Utopian. Senator Lodge in 1914 at the Commencement at Union College had advocated a League of Nations and Senator Knox had done the same in a Commencement address at the University of Pennsylvania. On May 27, 1916, in Washington, at a great banquet of the League to Enforce Peace, to the great joy of all present, President Wilson, for the first time, came out strongly in favor of such a league. No one who was there will ever

forget that memorable occasion and the enthusiasm produced by President Wilson's outspoken and unequivocal pronouncement. President Wilson had been introduced by ex-President Taft, who, like Roosevelt had long preceded Wilson in advocating the great idea. This was not the only occasion when ex-President Taft was to sink his political differences and stand shoulder to shoulder with President Wilson in behalf of a League of Nations. On that particular occasion, which of course was before the League of Nations had really gotten into politics, Senator Lodge had spoken just before President Wilson and eloquently supported the idea of a Peace League, just as he had done two years before.

Later, after we had entered the War, in quick succession, there followed: (1) the proposal by President Wilson, January 8, 1918, of a League of Nations as the last of his famous Fourteen Points; (2) the Armistice based on these Fourteen Points, November 11, 1918; (3) the first draft of the actual League of Nations drawn up by the commission on that subject in Paris of which President Wilson was chairman, February 14, 1919; (4) the criticism of certain senators; (5) the White House Conference with the Senate Committee on Foreign

Affairs on the first return of President Wilson from the Peace Conference, after the tentative draft of the League of Nations had been approved by the Conference; (6) the "round-robin" of March 4, 1919, pledging 37 senators to oppose the League; (7) the final draft of the League, incorporating most of the suggestions of Taft, Root, Hughes and others including that as to the Monroe Doctrine (with many misgivings from France who feared it would limit the protection afforded by Article X); (8) its adoption by the Peace Conference, as a part of the Treaty with Germany, five months after the Armistice; (9) its submission by the President to the Senate July 10, 1919; (10) the fight in the United States Senate and the President's refusal to compromise beyond a certain point; (11) the vote, March 19, 1920, after eight months' debate, with a large majority in favor of ratification (57 to 37) but lacking the necessary two-thirds; (12) the campaign of 1920 with the Democrats specifically for the League and the Republicans divided on the League but pledged in its platform to an "Association of Nations"; (13) in the present administration the important proposals for Naval Disarmament recommended by the Washing-

ton Conference and those for a Four Power Pact.

OTHER NATIONS

While Americans were gravely discussing the League question as though it were a question of whether there should *be* any league of nations, the other nations, one after another, ratified the League Covenant. At the present writing 52 nations are members of the League. The following eleven nations are outside: Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Ecuador, Germany, Iceland, Irak (Mesopotamia), the Irish Free State, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, and the United States. No member has yet entered with reservations, not even Switzerland, although she was assured by vote of the League Council that she would not be obliged to take part in any military action or to allow passage of foreign troops. Three states, Germany, the Irish Free State and Irak are expected shortly to join the League. Germany is already a full-fledged member of the Labor Organization, under the League.

In short, the United States is to-day the only important civilized nation immediately eligible which is not a member of the League.

WHY WE DID NOT JOIN

How does it happen that we, with all our love of peace and all our constructive work for peace through Roosevelt, Taft, Root, Hughes and Wilson, are still outside the League while practically the rest of the world is inside? In one word the answer is: Politics. We should undoubtedly have been in the League—and without reservations—had the White House and the Senate been of the same political complexion,—both Democratic or both Republican. In fact it is possible that we should have been in the League if Senator Newberry had not been allowed to take the seat which afterwards he was forced by pressure of public opinion to relinquish (since without him the Republican control of the Senate would have been doubtful; for if La Follette be considered Independent, the Republicans and Democrats would have been tied). We should have been in the League if a few pivotal senators had remained consistently for the League idea. We might have been in the League if President Wilson in the first place had conferred earlier and more frequently with the Senate and had invited, say, Root and Taft to Paris so that the League Covenant might have

been more fully their joint work. We might have been in the League if President Wilson had not asked the country to support the Democrats in 1918 and opened the way for playing politics with foreign affairs. It is quite possible that we should have been in the League if the Armistice had happened to come before the election instead of a week after; for the enthusiasm over the winning the War might have kept a majority for the Democrats. It is quite possible that we should have been in the League if President Wilson had not been struck down by illness. It is possible that we should have been in the League had Colonel House been allowed, during President Wilson's illness, to reach his bedside and advise him to yield a little in order to win a little more political support in the Senate. We might possibly have ratified had the Treaty come up for ratification in the United States after instead of before the other 52 nations of the world had ratified. The minority senators might have been less obdurate if the President had not said that the League was necessarily and inextricably interwoven with the Treaty. On such slender threads do great political events sometimes hang!

Whose fault was it? There is little use at

this time in crying over spilt milk or in wrangling over who's to blame.

THE LEAGUE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE TREATY

Out of it all we may have at least one great satisfaction, namely that now we can discuss the League without discussing the Treaty of Versailles. Our separate treaty with Germany (whatever its faults) had at least the merit of leaving the League issue simple and uncomplicated. It was the Treaty which killed the League. Many of the objections and much of the ill-feeling in the Senate discussion and in the political campaign of 1920 were directed against the Treaty—the Reparations, the disposition of German Colonies and Alsace-Lorraine, especially the turning over of so much to Great Britain, the fact that Fiume was not given to Italy nor Shantung to China. All these and many other questions were joined with or confused with the League question. They need be so confused no longer. Those who think the Treaty of Versailles was wrong in many ways (and I am among them) can approve the League without being deterred by their disapproval of some of the Treaty (especially as some of the Treaty's defects, notably

Shantung, have subsequently been eliminated or reduced, thanks to Secretary Hughes).

We are also fortunate, at the present time, in having no political campaign to complicate the question.

Surely it is high time that we resolve, and resolve solemnly, to sink our old differences and forget, so far as we can, the old storm centers, namely, (1) the Treaty and its enemies; (2) Wilson and his enemies; and (3) the Republican-Democratic struggle; and, following in the footsteps of our greatest conciliator, "With malice towards none, with charity for all" consider *on its merits* the great question of whether or not our America shall join with the 52 other nations in the effort to bind up the wounds of this bleeding world and safeguard it against ever getting so grievously hurt again.

III. "A" LEAGUE ESSENTIAL

FOR THREE REASONS

WE have seen that the idea of "a" league of nations had, for centuries, been latent—in solution as it were—before the World War finally precipitated it into its crystallized form, and that, at present, "the" League which thus resulted embraces practically the whole world except ourselves, thus leaving for us the important question: Shall or shall we not join this League?

I am one of those who believe that the League of Nations—or let us, in this chapter, say "a" league of nations—is not only desirable but *absolutely essential*—from the standpoint of the self-interest of the world in general and of the United States in particular.

It is "absolutely essential" for three reasons, any one of which would be sufficient to justify that phrase.

First, it is absolutely essential if we are successfully to wind up the war,—finish the job.

Secondly, it is absolutely essential if we are to prevent competitive armaments.

Thirdly, it is absolutely essential if we are to prevent a recurrence of world wars.

Besides these three essential reasons there is a fourth which, while not now essential, may ultimately prove to be the most important, namely to promote the general welfare and progress of the world in humanitarian, economic, financial, political, social and intellectual ways. It is in these ways that our own United States is to-day chiefly useful rather than merely in the original way of settling disputes and keeping the peace between the states.

ESSENTIAL TO WIND UP THE WAR

First, as to winding up the War, we must not forget that the War did not "settle" everything; on the contrary, it *un*settled almost everything; it destroyed nations, it created new nations on paper. Some dozen new sovereignties have come into existence.

There are Albania, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia (officially the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom), the Austrian Republic, Hungary. There are also some semi-independent bodies like Palestine, Armenia, Irak, Georgia and Azer-

baijan. Many of these are, as ex-President Taft said, as helpless as Cuba and will have to be treated just as Cuba was treated, when we tried to set her up in independent business. These small states will be even more at the mercy of the great states than was Belgium, if we do not in some way guarantee their actual, as opposed to nominal, independence. In fact, while we have been waiting, aggression has been going on. Turkey and Greece have both been aggressive, taking advantage of the breach of unity between England and France. Their violations already threaten to involve us all in another world war.

The action of Turkey in trying to regain territory lost by the War is only a sample of what may be expected of Russia, Germany or many other countries when occasion offers. They will attempt to recover power on the slightest pretext or provocation. The Near East where the World War started is, as a consequence of the War, even more a bone of contention than it was before. The little states, notably Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Hungary wedged between the greater states, Russia, Germany, Austria and Turkey, are a constant temptation and will so remain, until the Turk, the Russian, the German, the French and

every other hungry power understands that the world is sufficiently united, powerful and determined to make aggression a hopeless undertaking.

SOME PROBLEMS FOR A LEAGUE

Then there are the great problems of the land-locked countries which must have an outlet to the sea. There are also certain international regions which should be administered by a League of Nations, such as the city of Danzig and the Saar Valley which are now so administered, and the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus which now threaten war.

Then there are the German Colonies which are now administered under mandates, responsible to the League of Nations.

Then again, the Reparations and the inter-allied debts need readjustment, and it should be clear, by this time, that they must be considered as part of one problem. These and other revisions of the Treaty can be made peacefully only through international agreement.

No set of men about a green table in Paris, just following a world war, could have been wise enough, as President Wilson said, to know all the problems which would arise or how to

solve them. But, while they could not make permanent *settlements,* they could make a permanent *machinery* for settlement. The actual settlements will require many, many years.

Again, the world needs some international administration, or at the very least, *policy,* in regard to food, in regard to raw materials, in regard to finances, in regard to ships, in regard to stabilizing and building up economic life generally. A hungry (economically suppressed) nation will fight for food. By some agreement or general commission or readjustments, the distress may be relieved with no loss to any other nation and no war. The lack of adequate and dispassionate attention to these matters is largely responsible for the collapse of the money and finances of many countries and for the collapse of our trade with Europe, reacting disastrously on our trade at home and hurting the American farmer, manufacturer and laborer dependent on foreign markets. These problems, the importance of which is gradually being realized by American business, banking, and agricultural interests, will be again referred to in a later chapter.

Last but not least, the ill-feeling which the war left, especially between France and Germany, can be assuaged best by international


agencies in which the United States must play the chief rôle as peacemaker. Every observer was impressed by the fact that the American troops in Germany were like oil upon the troubled waters while, naturally, the French troops were a constant irritation. And now the Americans are gone while the French are in the Ruhr!

From this first standpoint alone, then, that merely of winding up the war, of finishing the job, of restoring peaceful and normal commerce, we need a league of nations. Otherwise our unfinished job will continue to plague us, just as it is now doing, and has been doing ever since we left it unfinished.

TO AVOID COMPETITIVE ARMAMENTS

Secondly, we need a league of nations in order to avoid a recurrence of what has constituted a veritable curse even in times of peace,—competitive armaments. Before the war, for many years, Germany and France had been competing in armies. When Germany first increased her army beyond that of France, France tried to catch up and made enormous sacrifices in taxes. But the instant France did this Germany strode ahead again, whereupon France tugged and strained in a desperate hope

How Nations Gamble



COMPETITION IN ARMAMENTS

of reaching equality with Germany, and so on in a vicious circle. In the same way, Germany and England were racing each other, with respect to their navies. Meanwhile Russia was steadily increasing her army beyond that of either France or Germany. Russian Pan-Slavism competed with Prussian Pan-Germanism. So competed almost all countries, to the great cost and injury of every producer of real wealth.

THE GREAT PARADOX

Such international cut-throat competition in armies and navies always leaves the nations, in the end, in substantially the same relative positions that they would have held had there been no increase in armaments whatever. Yet they must each, in self-defense, keep up in this mad race, or be left behind. This introduces a strange paradox: It is not to the advantage of any *one* country to keep out of such a competition, if it cannot have any assurance as to what the other countries are going to do; nevertheless, in the end, it will emerge no better off than it started. In other words, in such cut-throat competition the motive of *individual* advantage in the end defeats itself. This can only be prevented by *collective* action. As long

as we have no voice in reducing armaments and navies abroad, we cannot drop out of the race. To do so would not deter the others, but, on the contrary, give them the very chance which they coveted to get ahead. It is then a case of "each for himself and Devil take the hindmost."

A new invention is of only temporary use to the nation bringing it out. The airplane enabled us to discover the enemy plans, but also helped equally the enemy to discover ours. The enemy developed poison gas and aerial warfare, and had the advantage, but only until we could respond. We invented "tanks" which gave us an advantage only until the enemy adopted them.

The situation under such competition, even in times of peace, is like that in the pioneer mining days of anarchy in California when many men were thrown close together without any government. Then each man had to carry a pistol because everybody else did. The only important effect of the voluntary disarmament of one person—such as a doctrinaire pacifist might recommend—would have been to endanger his own life. Only when vigilance committees were improvised, and later a police system developed, could the individual Cali-

fornian disarm. Roosevelt saw the principle clearly and urged national preparedness. Borah and Hughes saw it clearly and urged concerted disarmament. The choice lies between these two—more arming *individually* or less arming *collectively*. The former costs money. The latter requires a leaguing together of nations.

The United States has reached the parting of the ways. *Either we must compete in armament with the rest of the world, or combine in disarmament with the rest of the world.*

A very slight degree of combination will often effect a marvelous prevention of armament. It was by a very simple agreement that Sweden and Norway avoided fortifying their boundary. The same was true as between Chile and the Argentine (as the statue of the Christ of the Andes so eloquently testifies) and as between Canada and the United States—with not a single fortification on 3000 miles of boundary.

The agreement between Canada and the United States was made in President Monroe's administration by his Secretary of State without even the formality of a treaty, but has endured uninterrupted for over a century. It reads in part as follows:

"The naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes by His Majesty and the Government of the United States shall henceforth be confined to the following vessels:

"On Lake Ontario, to one vessel not exceeding 100 tons burden and armed with one 18-pound cannon.

"On the upper lakes, to two vessels not exceeding like burden each and armed with like force.

"On the waters of Lake Champlain, to one vessel not exceeding like burden and armed with like force.

"All other vessels on these lakes shall be forthwith dismantled, and no other vessels of war shall be there built or armed."

Though no explicit arrangement was made as to destruction of forts, these were presently dismantled and no more built. This understanding (partly tacit only) has saved untold millions of dollars to both Canada and the United States, to say nothing of possibly saving human life.

THE COST OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENSE

Furthermore, if, for lack of an effective league of nations, we revert to international anarchy and each nation has to be its own protector, these past burdens of militarism which Europe had to bear before the war will be as nothing compared with the future economic

burdens which, under such circumstances, are sure to develop with the years and, in fact, are already developing in France, Turkey, Russia and elsewhere.

France, for example, now has nearly 700,000 men under arms. She thinks she must thus protect herself since the United States, the most impartial of nations, is not a member of the League of Nations, nor is it otherwise participating in European affairs; and in particular England and the United States have failed to join with her in a separate alliance for mutual protection.

A large part of Europe is to-day sinking under its many burdens, including this burden of militarism, a burden which can only be lifted through a real league of disarmament in which we all join. European budgets are not balanced and the various moneys are losing their value. The economic strength of the world is largely absorbed in the great and vain race of nations to keep up with each other, with no net result except losses to all. The only agencies which have lessened these burdens are the League of Nations which, for instance, has lessened the debt burdens of Austria, and international conferences, such as the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments which, if

ratified, will lessen the burden of naval armaments. What is needed is more such league action and conference action.

Even if the competition in armaments were no greater than before the War it would nevertheless be felt as more burdensome because the world is in a state of economic exhaustion.

The United States was caught unprepared in the late War; we can't afford to be caught so again. The price of immunity from such disaster in the future is, as Roosevelt has so often said, *either* on the one hand, to go into this race in dead earnest, to have one of the largest navies in the world, a larger standing army than at present, great munition factories and to pile up great accumulations of armaments, *or,* on the other hand, to league with other nations in limiting armaments. In fact, since the latter alternative has been in abeyance, the former is being officially recommended by Admiral Sims and Secretary Denby of the Navy Department and by General Pershing and Secretary Weeks of the War Department. We must keep up the search for death-dealing gas; we must maintain gentlemanly spies to learn what other nations are doing along these lines; we must know that spies have to be maintained by our seeming friends to know what we are

doing! And all of these facts are provocative of suspicion and the war spirit. The cost for such a program would not be a matter of three hundred million dollars a year as it was before the War (and even that figure, at to-day's prices, would become half a billion). Because of the new inventions of war, tanks, airplanes, the great gas asphyxiating devices, and all the other abominations,—to say nothing of the improvements and inventions surely in store for us in the future, we should probably, before many years, have to expend, not simply a half billion but two or three billion dollars a year at the least. The present Naval Appropriation bill alone amounts to $315,000,000! Yet Pershing and Sims are entirely right in urging an immediate start in this deadly race, *if* we are not all to join in disarmament. Only on condition that we are so to join may we, as Pershing says, avoid such a race. As has been indicated, if the Hughes treaties are ratified by the other nations we may be saved thereby from *some* naval rivalry, but to be safe from *all* rivalry we must go much further. Mr. Justice Clarke stated recently, on the authority of a general in our army, that "seventeen nations are even now diligently preparing for the next war."

Occasionally evidence crops up that certain special interests, including munition makers, have been active in opposing the League and supporting, through campaign contributions, the election of senators opposed to the League. The League Covenant recognizes that: "The manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections," and aims to find measures for overcoming this evil.

CONCLUSION

We have seen, then, the strange paradox that competitive armaments harm every nation and yet, in a world of international anarchy, are unavoidable. We have also seen that the burden of armaments to-day is unendurable and that, except in the case of munition makers, there is scarcely an individual but that would find his financial condition improved if, through concerted disarmament, the tax burden could be lessened.

To get rid of this ubiquitous nuisance, this fatal rivalry in armaments, doing, in the end, no good to anybody but evil to everybody, a leaguing together of nations is absolutely essential just as we found it to be absolutely essential in order to tie up the many loose ends

which the World War left as problems requiring many years for settlement.

Besides these two essential reasons for our joining the (or "a") league of nations is the third,—that of preventing war,—to be next considered.

IV. WHY WARS OCCUR

PHILOSOPHY OF WAR

THE third and most important reason for a league is to prevent the recurrence of a world war and its colossal sacrifice of life, happiness, personal health, racial vigor, morals and treasure. Perhaps the best way to see how a league operates to prevent war is to see how the absence of a league causes war.

Many people see only the immediate causes of war and fail to see the general causes which make war sooner or later inevitable. For instance, to say that "the Kaiser caused the World War" indicates very superficial thinking. He is entitled to much of the blame he has received; for he was an immediate cause. Yet back of his personality the essential seeds or conditions of war existed and are more in evidence to-day than they were in 1914.

The true philosophy of war is not so much one of praise or blame, as of social cause and effect. The great and useless slaughter

which we have so recently witnessed affords a study in social pathology. The universal war fever which seemed so suddenly to burst on Europe in 1914 was but a symptom of a terrible disease of the body politic, a disease which had been increasingly gnawing at the vitals of Europe for generations.

The essential condition out of which wars spring is that of *unregulated* international *intercourse,*—in short international *anarchy;* for intercourse without regulation means anarchy. This is the chief political disease from which the world suffers. It always breaks out afresh as regions previously separated come into contact through growth of population and facilities for travel, transportation and communication.

We can best realize the truth of this last statement if we reflect on the growth of rapid transportation. A century ago the natural barriers (mountains, rivers and distances) between the countries of Europe separated them at least as widely as the Atlantic Ocean now separates us from Europe, if not as widely as the Pacific separates us from Japan and China. But the railroad, steamship, airship, telegraph, telephone, radio and newspaper have virtually destroyed most of these barriers.

RAPID TRANSPORTATION

This rapid growth of transportation and communication, in the absence of an equal growth of their regulation, leads to or aggravates war in at least four ways:

(1) by the exploration, colonization and exploitation of outlying regions of the earth;
(2) by making international trade a larger and larger apple of discord, or prize for which the nations eagerly strive;
(3) by increasing the chances of friction or irritation of all kinds. International "incidents" relating to or growing out of the contacts of commerce, travel or communication repeatedly threaten war;
(4) by increasing the speed of army mobilization, thus bringing nations within shorter military distance of each other.

Examples of (1) are the case of America, where the white colonists collided first with the aborigines, then with each other (in the Colonial wars) as population groups expanded and interfered with each other; and later the colonizing and exploiting of South Africa, leading to the Boer War.

As an example of (2) may be cited the trade through and across the Bosphorus, a chief bone of contention before, during and since the World War. Germany wanted a trade route from Berlin to Bagdad and Russia wanted the intersecting highway to the sea. The Bosphorus thus marks the crossroads between Europe and Asia. The Near Eastern or Turkish problem is largely concerned with this crossroads.

Examples of (3) are the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria while traveling, the torpedoing of the Lusitania while carrying goods and passengers, and, to mention a present war menace, the constant irritation on our western coast over oriental labor.

The greater the international intercourse, the more often such contacts occur. Accordingly, it is on the border between nations, where the contact is most close and most frequent, that international hatred often becomes most intense.

An example of (4) is the building of strategic railways by Russia immediately preceding 1914 or the use of the war railways in the World War, especially by Germany. The railway systems of France and Germany for war

use are definitely laid out just as all their main highways are laid out.

HEALTHY ORGANISMS

In physiology, health is described as a harmonious adjustment of organs. If the heart is either too strong or too weak or if any other organ of the body is too large or too small, disease exists. The commercial relations between nations have grown so fast that the international law and its sanctions, necessary to take care of these relations, does not keep pace with them. In the terms of Herbert Spencer, who was fond of calling society an organism, the "regulative" function of the social organism is under-developed as compared with the "sustaining" function.

The reason why the economic structure usually grows faster than the political structure is that the former grows all the time, whereas the latter grows only by sudden leaps. In other words, the growth of industry and commerce is continuous and quiet, while government changes are sudden and explosive. It is the fear of losing a fraction of "sovereignty" which keeps political structures unchanged long beyond the time when change is the logic of the situation. The result is that, in the absence of

regulative international law of some kind, the growth of international commercial interests has actually added to the risk of great wars and created a need of great armies and navies. Great Britain considers her navy as a safeguard for her commerce.

WRONG REASONING OF COBDEN

It used to be thought that the development of international trade was the very circumstance which would save Europe from war. Over a half century ago Cobden prophesied that international trade would bring international peace. Yet since that time some of the greatest and bloodiest wars of history have occurred, including the very greatest and bloodiest. Cobden wrote: "Whilst the governments are preparing for war, all the tendencies of the age are in the opposite direction; but that which most loudly and constantly thunders in the ears of the emperors, kings and parliaments the stern command, 'You shall not break the peace,' is the multitude which in every country subsists upon the products of labor applied to materials brought from abroad."

It is true that the growth of commerce increased the *need* of peace, but it is not true that it has increased the *probability* of peace.

While peace has grown more and more necessary, war has scarcely become any less frequent.

THE DISEASE AND ITS CURE

We see then that our world disease may be roughly described as the "hypertrophy of international commerce" relatively to international law or the "arrested development of international law" relatively to international commerce. The basic fact is that the *world has shrunk* into one great neighborhood but has not yet adjusted itself to its new state of existence.

Naturally, the cure of this disease, since we cannot *reduce the commerce,* is to *increase the law*—that is to develop the under-developed organ, to increase the sanctions, or regulative force, of international law and to add to such law. That is the central purpose of a league of nations.

WHAT A LEAGUE CAN DO

A league reduces the chances of war because it allows international regulation to grow up to international intercourse, and so affords an *alternative to war* as a way to settle the inevitable disputes. There are two ways of settling any dispute. One is for the two interested parties to fight it out, and the other is for them to

submit it to a third party who is disinterested. The first way we shall call, for short, the *war* method and the second the *law* method. When the law method is used the national pride, instead of so often leading to war, is transferred to the keeping of treaties. It need not go to war to "save its face" rather than recede from an untenable position; for the award of the disinterested third party will preserve its self-respect.

IF THE LEAGUE HAD EXISTED IN 1914

If the League had been in existence years prior to 1914, the commercial rivalries would probably not have developed into the land-grabbing policy carried out by England, France, Italy, Germany and Austria. If the League had been in existence in July, 1914, the War would probably never have happened. Lord Grey has stated this opinion quite positively. There are four good reasons for this belief: (1) the nations concerned would probably not have been armed to the teeth; (2) the circumstances leading up to the War would probably have been altered by friendly intervention had they been under the scrutiny of a central body organized for that purpose; (3) had they, however, progressed toward the danger point,

Germany and Austria could scarcely have refused Sir Edward Grey's suggestion of a conference when a conferring body stood ready and did not have to be built up; and (4) in all probability the offender never would have dared to begin a war, had it been apparent *then,* that to begin it would mean to offend all the rest of the world and all at once.

CHANGED MOTIVES OF NATIONS UNDER A LEAGUE

With a true peace league each member-nation would thus have several restraints from attacking any other member, in particular its sense of national honor and its feeling of the hopelessness of resisting the whole world.

Incidentally, the mutual guarantees tend to disarmament; for the psychology of motive will ultimately become the opposite of what it now is. That is, when each nation feels security, as each state of the United States now feels security, it will gradually perceive that while it bears all the *burden* of its own military force, it is not getting all the *benefit,* but chiefly contributing to the benefit of the others. In short, militarism will then be felt simply as a tax. Therefore, instead of being spurred on to get

as *large* an army as the rest, the tendency will be to keep the quota as *small* as the rest. Any individual nation will feel itself imposed upon if it be required to maintain more than its share of the force. Thus the uselessness of large standing armies will be brought home to each nation *individually*. A nation's army will then reduce to a state militia.

Of course this complete reversal in the psychology of militarism will take a long time. In the meantime a great motive to keep down armies will be in order to avoid the censure of world opinion.

A LEAGUE AS INSURANCE

The (or "a") League, from a commercial point of view, constitutes a great mutual war insurance company, each nation joining because it is both cheaper and more effectual to provide against war by paying small insurance premiums to pay for a league than by maintaining a great army.

A fuller statement is that the League is for *mutual* protection of all kinds (saving life and moral values as well as saving merely money) thus removing the necessity for so much *self*-protection. No nation loses anything except the right to attack other nations. If that is a

technical impairment of sovereignty it is an impairment which should be welcomed by all.

SUMMARY

We have found three reasons why a league is absolutely essential: (1) in order to wind up the war; (2) in order to prevent oppressive taxes for armaments in times of peace; (3) in order to prevent future wars.

V. IS MAN A FIGHTING ANIMAL?

OBJECTIONS TO NEW IDEAS

BUT, says the cynic, any effort to abolish war is futile. War has always existed and always will. It is natural and inevitable "because man is a fighting animal."

Every new idea has to run the gauntlet of such objections—"nothing can be done about it." When cannibalism was in vogue, any who should have proposed to abolish it would have been laughed to scorn. If we could imagine these early men "reasoning," i.e., making excuses, they would say: "Abolish cannibalism? The idea! It is natural and inevitable. Otherwise it would not be so universal. Human flesh is obviously the best food for making human flesh. The race will degenerate without it and become a race of mollycoddles." In the same way even Aristotle, the wisest man of his time, made the mistake of thinking that slavery could never be abolished. In the same way it was argued that dueling could not be

abolished. Yet cannibalism, slavery and dueling have actually been abolished almost completely.

In the present case of abolishing war we can readily disprove the claim that man is so naturally combative as to make war a necessary and permanent institution.

WHAT BIOLOGY SHOWS

The theory that war is natural, and therefore inevitable, has no sound basis in biology, anthropology or history.

Every animal has, of course, the instinct of self-preservation and will defend itself if necessary. There is, therefore, some pugnacity in every animal. But, beyond this universal attribute common to all animals, man has none of the attributes of a natural fighter. Lions and tigers have claws and protruding jaws and fangs, showing plainly that they are, by nature, fighting animals. The bull has horns with which to gore; the swordfish, a blade with which to cut. But take away from man his artificial sword and gun and other accoutrements of war, strip him naked, and what do we find? He has no claws, no "sabre-tooth" nor any other natural weapon for aggression. When he fights it is merely with his clenched fists. Man has

been forced to use his brains and contrive *artificial* instruments to make up for the fact that nature did *not* provide him with fighting instruments. So he has used sticks and stones, bows and arrows, guns, tanks, gas, and all the rest.

WHAT ANTHROPOLOGY SHOWS

Moreover, in general, even among most so-called savages, anthropologists report, peace not war seems usually to be the normal state and fighting is not sought for the sake of fighting.

One of the greatest anthropologists, William Graham Sumner, in his "War and Other Essays" said:

> "Man, in the most primitive and uncivilized state known to us, does not practice war all of the time; he dreads it; he might rather be described as a peaceful animal. Real warfare comes with the collisions of more developed societies.
>
> "Livingstone says that the tribes in the interior of South Africa, where no slave trade existed, seldom had any war except about cattle, and some tribes refused to keep cattle in order not to offer temptation.
>
> "A Spanish priest, writing an account, in 1739, of the Aurohuacos of Colombia, says that they have no weapons of offense or defense. If two quarrel they go out to a big rock or tree and each with his staff beats the rock or tree with vituperations. The

one whose staff breaks first is the victor; then they embrace and return home as friends."

This custom evidently expresses strong aversion to fighting. Its avoidance was accomplished by something very suggestive of Professor William James' "moral equivalent of war."

WHAT HISTORY SHOWS

But why, then, has human history been an apparent succession of wars? The answer is, as will presently be clearly seen, that the growth of population produced collisions and quarrels between tribes or groups of men, formerly separated by distance. While *within* each group peaceful means to settle disputes had been developed, no such means had yet developed as *between* the groups.

The collision had, therefore, caught them unprepared to adjudicate quarrels and so they had to fight them out; there was no alternative.

Of course the grievance is often fancied and what is supposed to be defense practically amounts to offense. The foreigner is suspected and disliked as a "barbarian" because he is unknown, and what is unknown is always feared. Each tribe thinks the other tribes willful and aggressive, but thinks itself ready to "bury the

hatchet" if only those wicked barbarians would consent.

The so-called fighting instinct is not altogether selfish aggressiveness for plunder or mere bloodthirstiness but rather the instinct for "glory" through self-sacrifice, the willingness to die for one's family, tribe, country or religion. The psychology of the human fighter is usually that he is defending his fireside and his country against unjust attack. To himself he often seems to be engaged in a "holy crusade" rather than the depredations of a beast of prey, although to the enemy it seems the other way. The German soldier quite as much as the English or the American thought he was fighting a "holy" war. Thus the typical warrior fights for honor rather than booty. The fact that we reward the fighter with honor has made fighting attractive and not any native human instinct to attack others without provocation.

History shows that, *when given the alternative,* man almost always manages to settle disputes by peaceful rather than by warlike methods, in short by *law* rather than by *war.* The fact that he has progressively substituted law for war proves this proposition beyond possibility of doubt. We may, if we like, call man a

quarrelsome animal; but he is not by choice a *fighting* animal. In fact, the whole history of civilization may be described as the replacement, over increasingly large areas, of war by law, as the standard method of settling quarrels.

This replacement was at first more or less unconscious, more akin to "natural selection" than to conscious choice. Primitive man casts about more or less aimlessly until he hits on an adjustment which endures because it is better fitted to endure.

ENLARGING THE PEACE GROUP. THE FAMILY

Originally there was no protection of law, so that presumably *each individual* had to protect himself or herself. Family quarrels were settled as Cain and Abel settled theirs. To rid the *family* of fratricide and patricide, a family government evolved in which, as among the ancient Hebrews, the patriarch representing the family group settled family quarrels and so preserved the peace as between individuals within the family.

THE COMMUNITY

By this means, peace reigned as a rule until, with the growth of population, families were

no longer merely isolated nomads or agricultural families, on ranches as it were, but became clustered into a community. Consequently two families in the community often clashed with each other and war reappeared, because there was then no other way to settle feuds between families. We find such family feuds among the ancient Hebrews and in most primitive communities. The tragedies involved are set forth by Shakespeare in "Romeo and Juliet." A recrudescence of the family feud institution is still found in the backwoods of Kentucky. To avoid these feuds, *community* or tribal governments and courts were devised because the general sentiment of the community preferred to settle disputes between families by a justice of the peace rather than by bloodshed. Such tribal governments were exemplified among the American Indians and still are by the Indians in Mexico.

THE STATE

But, as the population continued to grow, so that the communities or villages were no longer few and far between but began to border on each other, war appeared again between the villages, as exemplified by the revengeful headhunters in the Philippines.

FEDERATION OF STATES

Then once again did men extend "the peace group" by creating a *state* to include many communities and adjusting the inter-community quarrels by law instead of by war. But, as population still continued to grow, these states next came in contact, clashed and went to war, that being then the only way to settle *their* disputes until once again was the peace group enlarged and the states were federated into a *federation* of states, or a nation, such as the United States.

THE LEAGUE

Finally,—and again through the pressure and contact of increasing population,—came the World War between nations and, as its expensive lesson began to be learned, once more the peace group was enlarged to form the *League of Nations.*

Imperfect attempts had been previously made, some of which, like the Hague Conference, and fifty-three present international associations, contributed ready-made material toward the formation of the League of Nations.

PEACE BY ISOLATION

At each stage in this evolution we have the spectacle of a number of *isolated neighborhoods* dotting the land, each possessed of law to keep the peace *within* itself but at first with no corresponding mechanism to keep the peace *between* them. So long as there is plenty of land, or little population, these neighborhoods may be so far apart as to lack the contacts which may cause disputes. Their isolation keeps the peace.

If any two neighborhoods are too close they may, in the interests of peace, separate further. In the Bible we read of Abram and Lot resorting to this method of further isolation:

> "And there was a strife between the herdmen of Abram's cattle and the herdmen of Lot's cattle;
>
> "And Abram said unto Lot, let there be no strife, I pray thee, between me and thee, and between my herdmen and thy herdmen . . . separate thyself, I pray thee, from me: if thou wilt take the left hand, then I will go to the right; or if thou depart to the right hand, then I will go to the left."

But, with the growth of population and intercourse, this method of keeping the peace (by isolation) becomes impossible. Then the Abram and Lot neighborhoods will touch again

and be unable to avoid quarrels and these quarrels will have to be settled, at first, by the war method, because there is no alternative. Later, driven by bitter experience, the neighborhoods institute the law method; that is, the peace group is enlarged. Over and over again, at each stage in the growth of population, do we find this cycle: isolation, contact, quarrels, war, law, by which the peace group has been successively enlarged. War enters at each stage only to be banished in wider and wider circles because man is *not* by nature a fighting animal but instinctively and unconsciously substitutes law for war.

In short, as Sumner said:

"Wherever there is no war, there we find that there is no crowding, as among the scattered Eskimo, or that, after long fighting, treaties and agreements have been made to cover all relations of interest between the groups. These we call peace-pacts, and it is evident that they consist in conventional agreements creating some combination between the groups which are parties to the agreement.

"One of the most remarkable examples of a peace-group which could be mentioned is the League of the Iroquois, which was formed in the sixteenth century; it deserves to be classed here with the peace institutions of civilized states. This league was a confederation of five, afterwards six tribes of Indians, to maintain peace. By Indian usage blood

revenge was a duty; but the Iroquois confederation put a stop to this, as between its members, by substituting laws and civil authority."

We see then that peace comes either from isolation or aggregation. (It is not forgotten, of course, that the latter often comes about by conquest as well as by peace-pacts.)

In the days of Washington, America was isolated enough not to have very many quarrels with the rest of the world. But to-day, with the growth of intercourse, the Eastern and Western hemispheres are in daily contact and cannot separate as Abram and Lot did. A "policy of isolation" to-day is a delusion and a snare. It means no real isolation but merely a refusal to recognize that the world has become one vast neighborhood.

LAW REPLACING WAR

Much of what we call the process of civilization consists, then, precisely in these successive abolitions of war through the enlargements of the peace group from family to community, to state, to nation, to the League of Nations. At every such enlargement the people have been forced to adopt the law method in place of the war method.

The essence of "law," as here used, is the

reference of a dispute between the two interested parties to a third disinterested party, or to tribal custom, with much else, of course, which such reference implies.

History thus clearly indicates that man, on the average, is primarily a peace loving animal, not a war loving animal. The sequence of events is always through three chief phases:

1. Isolation and peace (because few disputes);

2. Intercourse and war (because no other method);

3. Replacement of war by law.

The human race seems to go through these three phases to reach each stage of the peace group, namely: when no peace group exists but only individuals; when the peace group is only the family; when the peace group is the community; when it is the state; when it is the nation; and when it is the whole world.

WE STAND ALONE

When we think of it, is it not startling to consider that, for some reason, the United States has not yet taken the last step? The rest of the world realized that the hour had struck for this, the final and greatest step forward in the abolition of war, the extension of

the peace group to make it envelop the world. With that step taken, war as an institution disappears from off the earth. It will remain as sporadic conflicts just as dueling and murder, riot and rebellion remain but only as outlawed survivals of barbarism. It is not, and never was, an expression of any prevalent will of mankind.

Fifty-two nations have taken this final step in the evolution of civilization. Turkey, Russia and Mexico have not—nor the United States! And Mexico has not yet been invited because of the United States.

Let it not be forgotten, that, in all these steps from lawless individualism toward a warless world, man's nature has not greatly changed. Brothers still quarrel, villages, counties, the states of the United States, and the nations of the earth still disagree. But excepting in the last named case, these quarrels seldom result in fighting, for the very simple reason that an alternative method of settling the quarrels has been provided and is almost always insisted upon.

The original colonies of which the United States is now composed viewed each other with distrust, jealousy and hostility, as do now the sovereign states of Europe. A century and a


half ago, according to an old letter, a New York gentleman refused to send his son to Yale because Yale was in "that foreign and barbarous colony of Connecticut." These colonies fought the Colonial wars. But when, after being allied in the Revolution, they formed themselves into the United States, the feelings of suspicion and jealousy gradually disappeared. Since then, with one notable exception,—the Civil War,—they have invariably settled their disputes, 87 in number, by legal and peaceful methods, i.e., through the Supreme Court.

CONCLUSION

So much for the wholly unfounded objection that man is a fighting animal and cannot and will not abolish war. We see that it *has* been in process of abolition from the very first beginnings of law; that, in fact, what we call civilization largely consists precisely in this substitution of law for war; that only under the pressure of growing population and intercourse has war continued to crop up; that it has recurred between those newly grown into contact, where law had not yet had time to replace war.

Now, however, at last is there opportunity

Armament or Improved Farming?



FARM TRACTOR

A tractor and an automobile for every one of the 6,500,000 farms in the United States could be bought with the money the great war cost the United States for a half year, and there would be left

600 million dollars for good roads.

$22,600,000,000 was the total cost to the United States, which does not include loans to other nations.

(After the Disarmament Education Committee, 629 G St. N.W., Washington, D. C.)

for law to replace war altogether and forever, and, as Roosevelt said, by the only method which has ever succeeded, namely by so associating nations as to make law available as an alternative to war. The experience of all history proves that, when given the two alternatives, mankind will not "because he is by nature a warlike animal" choose war but, on the contrary, because he is "by nature a peaceful animal" will almost invariably choose law. The few who do not so choose will be outlaws and, like the criminals in our cities, must be restrained by the overwhelming power of the majority who *are* law abiding.

In short, the fundamental reason why war ever occurs is, in general, simply that no alternative method of settling disputes is available. The need of the hour is to realize that an alternative method now stands ready, if we will but use it.

As H. Hagedorn expresses it:

> "O World, there is *another way* to
> Serve Justice and Liberty than thus to fling
> The glory and the wonder of young lives
> Beneath the hoofs of horses!"

VI. WHAT IS THE LEAGUE?

"THE" LEAGUE, OR "A" LEAGUE?

MANY readers will say to themselves, at this point, "granted that we ought to have 'a' league of nations or 'some' kind of organization to abolish war, granted that the fundamental reason for war is the lack of any other effective method of settling disputes, granted that nations would prefer the law method rather than the war method of settlement because man is not naturally a fighting animal, granted everything which has thus far been brought forward, nevertheless we object to 'the' league; we think the proposed 'Harding Association of Nations' or the 'Hughes Four Power Pact' or the 'Root Court of Justice' would be better than 'the' League. How often do we hear it said: "I believe in 'a' league, but not in 'the' League"!

It would seem that the majority of people in America to-day have reached the point of thinking that America must abandon all idea of complete isolation and "in some way" help rescue and stabilize Europe. But they are perplexed

as to *what* way. Is it to be through the existing organization or not?

This brings us to the question: What are the objections alleged against "the" League? We can best weigh these objections after describing the main features of the League.

THE LEAGUE'S PURPOSES, METHODS, MECHANISM

We can see clearly how the League has been caricatured by its detractors if we will but read the League Covenant which, like the Constitution of the United States, is very short and simple. The reader who thinks he favors "a" but not "the" League is respectfully requested to ask himself whether he has ever read this document. It is given in full in the Appendix to this book, so arranged that any question concerning it can be very quickly answered. And an "A B C" of it is added. Here we need only state in brief (1) the purposes of the League, (2) the methods it employs for attaining those purposes, and (3) the machinery it possesses for operating those methods.

THE LEAGUE'S PURPOSES

The one central purpose of the League is to offer some alternative to war so that unless the

disputing nations really prefer war, they may have an easy, just and honorable method of escaping the necessity of war.

The League practically means, as Mr. Arthur Sweetser, an American member of the Secretariat, has so tersely put it, that the 52 nations "have solemnly signed a short, simple round-robin agreement, first, not to go to war without arbitration or conciliation, and, second, to work together for the general betterment of world relations. . . . It means that for the first time in history—and it is the first time—the bulk of the world's Nations have recognized a common moral responsibility for the preservation of peace and constituted an organization to make that responsibility effective."

THE LEAGUE'S METHODS

There are five principal methods on which the League relies to avoid war. They are: first, referring the dispute to a third party—in other words, judicial decision or arbitration, or conciliation; second, a "cooling-off" time while the third party is trying to arrive at a fair decision or recommendation; third, the possibility of a second or a third attempt at adjustment if the first is not accepted by the two con-

tending parties; fourth, if one of the two contending parties holds out against the decision or recommendation and the opinion of the world, the recalcitrant nation can be boycotted; fifth, as the last resort, military force can be applied if the other nations individually so decide.

THE LEAGUE'S MECHANISM

For applying these methods the League possesses four essential mechanisms:

First, the *Assembly* of all member-nations, which is important as a forum of discussion, giving every nation, however small, a chance to feel itself a participant in developing international policies. It is a sort of perpetual conference of nations, like the Washington conference, but with continuity and without being restricted to one subject. Its discussions will help clarify and codify those customs which we now dignify by the phrase "international law" and make them more respected, more often enforced and so more worthy of the name. Gradually there will emerge a real international code analogous to our national code of common law as well as additional rules analogous to statute laws.

A chief function of the Assembly is to elect

six members of the Council. These six, with the five permanent members of the Council, constitute a sort of Executive Committee of the League.

Second, this *Council* of eleven (originally nine) nations, in which the United States—like Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan—is entitled to representation as one of the five permanent members as soon as it enters the League. The other six members are elected, as just noted, by the Assembly. At present the elected members are Brazil, Spain, Uruguay, Belgium, Sweden and China.

The chief function of the Council is to afford a means for a *prompt conference* whenever any circumstance arises threatening world peace or good feeling and to smooth the matter out or to recommend to the individual sovereign nations suitable measures such as the prompt application of the boycott provided for in Article XVI.

The Council is not a *"super-state"* but a committee to report the situation, so that the joint and several guarantees to keep the peace and prevent its being broken may be made effective by the individual action of each nation when thus informed of the situation.

Third, a *Secretariat* for filing the records

of the League, maintaining continuously an office during the intervals between the meetings of the Council and Assembly, recording and publishing treaties, gathering international statistics and data for studying the international projects undertaken by the League, such as preventing the transmission of typhus and other diseases from Europe to America, preventing the traffic in women and children, regulating the traffic in drugs, carrying on the International Hydrographic Office and various other international offices (most of which existed prior to the League of Nations). The International Labor Office is more or less independent of the League. As already noted, Germany has membership in it although not in the League itself.

The Secretariat is much more than a routine, clerical office. It is of great importance as a permanent staff of technical experts, always available and constantly studying the many complex international problems before the world, conferring with each other, with those in the various countries concerned who are best equipped to help in the solution of these problems as well as with members of the Council or Assembly. Seven hundred people are now

employed constantly at the Secretariat at Geneva.

A fourth element of great importance has been created since the League was first formed, namely the *Permanent Court of International Justice*. The Court is competent to hear and determine any international dispute brought to it voluntarily by the contending parties.

HOW THE MECHANISM WORKS

The parts of all this machinery available for settling a dispute are the Court, the Council and the Assembly. If America were a member of the League and should have a dispute with Canada over the deep-sea fisheries off Newfoundland, we would first try to settle it peaceably without the League, merely through diplomacy. In most cases this would be successful. If not, the two countries are bound, as members of the League, to submit it to arbitration if both recognize it to be suitable for arbitration (Article XIII), agreeing on any arbitrator they wish, whether in the League or out of the League. They may take it to the International Court of Justice if both agree so to do. If they have not been able to agree to submit the dispute to arbitration they must at least submit it to inquiry by the Council.

Thus the "third party" appealed to by the United States and Canada may be either an arbitrator (like the Court) or a conciliator (like the Council).

If we submit the dispute to arbitration we must abide by the verdict.

If we submit it to the "inquiry" of the Council, the Council endeavors to make a settlement. If its efforts are not successful, it then makes a report.

If this report of the Council is unanimous and Canada rejects its decision while the United States accepts it, Canada can get no military help from Great Britain or any other member of the League; for these are all bound, as of course is Canada, not to "go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report."

If the report of the Council is not unanimous and is rejected by either party, there is no check on Canada or the United States or any other nation,—except as all are bound, as League members, in no case to resort to war for three months after the report of the Council.

The situation would then be just what it is now except that the League facilities still stand there for the use of the disputing parties if,

after the cooling-off period, they conclude to try again to avoid war.

MEMBERSHIP WOULD NOT DECREASE BUT INCREASE OUR POWERS

Such, in brief, is the way the League would work and is already working. It has no army; it can issue no commands. Its decisions are effective only because of the pledged word of the member nations to abide by the decisions. And, as shown above, a member is not, by its pledge always bound to avoid war.

The nearest approach to coercion comes only when a nation breaks its word. If Canada, after agreeing to arbitrate and so abide by the decision should refuse so to do, the other member-nations agree to consider Canada as making war on them all and to boycott her. If the boycott doesn't bring her to reason, the Council will "advise" the members. It may advise them to use military force, but if so, each nation would decide for itself whether it ought or ought not to follow this advice. Only if it believes it has a moral obligation would it accept the advice; and even if it did not accept it and seemed to other countries to shirk a plain duty, no other country could compel it to alter its course.

One important fact implied in this short summary of the League is that the Council's recommendations must be *unanimous* in order to impose even the slight obligation described (on the other members not to go to war against the United States if the United States agrees to accept the Council's recommendations). Consequently if the United States were a member of the League it would possess a veto power on the Council's action in any other country's dispute. In a dispute between Greece and Turkey or between Great Britain and France, if the United States chose to prevent an otherwise unanimous report, she could do so.

In short, membership in the League would give us power which we do not now possess, but would not deprive us of any power which we now possess (except the power to make unjust war which we do not want, and which, in fact, we had already done our best to surrender through numerous peace treaties before the League even existed).

What has been said refers to *settling* disputes after they arise. There are, however, other activities of the League tending to *prevent* disputes from arising at all. Such activities are the collection and exchange of information through the Secretariat in regard to

treaties, plotting against peace, cases of injustice, discontent, prejudice and myriads of other conditions. Knowledge is power, and such knowledge enables misunderstandings to be smoothed out early enough to head off any definite dispute. This function may be said to be even more important than the function of the Court or the Council on the principle that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

Besides the war-preventing activities of the League are welfare-promoting activities. Some of these will be described in Chapter IX.

CONCLUSION

We see, then, that the League is an organization now embracing 52 nations which confer through the Assembly, have an executive committee called the Council, an office staff called the Secretariat, a Court and other features. By study of the international situation, by publicity of treaties, by conference, conciliation, arbitration, boycott and in the last resort (provided, after receiving the *advice* of the Council, the nations individually decide it to be necessary) by military force, the League operates to maintain peace and to promote general welfare.

VII. OBJECTIONS ALLEGED AGAINST THE LEAGUE

CHIEF OBJECTIONS ENUMERATED

THE opponents of the League in America have alleged one objection after another; for instance, that it is impossible for America to enter, being unconstitutional; that the League is a "super-Government" impairing our sovereignty and binding us hand and foot; that it is weak and powerless, a house of cards, a rope of sand; that if it were of any use it would have prevented all Bolshevism and immediately snuffed out all embers of war in Europe; that the British Empire with its "Colonies" could out-vote us and override us; that the League would compel us to go to war against our will; that it could order our soldier boys abroad; that the League would create wars, instead of preventing them; that it would stereotype forever existing boundaries; that it would crush the hopes of Ireland; that it is a mechanism by which the Allies intend to cripple or destroy Germany.

IS THE LEAGUE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

If the League really violated in any respect any article of our Constitution any senator could be impeached for voting to have us join as it would violate his oath to defend the Constitution.

Mr. Justice Clarke, just resigned from the United States Supreme Court (for the express purpose of presenting the League question to his fellow countrymen) brushes aside such silly talk as did Mr. Taft, now Chief Justice. Justice Clarke further states:

> "Legally by joining the League we would not surrender in the least our national liberty, independence or sovereignty. It is as grotesque to talk of such a thing as it is to refer to the League as a super-state.
>
> "In this statement, I am but announcing agreement with the present Chief Justice of the United States, with Mr. Wickersham, a distinguished former Attorney-General of the United States; with ex-Senator Root, and with every lawyer and judge of reputation in the country—outside, of course, of the United States Senate."

THE LEAGUE CANNOT "ORDER" US

We have seen that with the United States safely *inside* the League, we would possess a veto power in the Council. No action could be

even recommended unless we, as a member, approved. And, of course, any military step by the United States would always require, in addition, action by Congress. The League has no authority to force any action on its members and no power even to levy taxes for its own support. It is not a real government, but only a league, i.e., a means by which sovereign nations may coöperate with each other. The League has been in operation for more than three years and has shown itself to be anything but a super-state. It does not impair sovereignty any more than, technically, any treaty whatever impairs the sovereignties of the nations signatory to it. Of course the Covenant, like any treaty, implies obligations as well as rights and, among those obligations, is a moral obligation to do what is right.

GREAT BRITAIN'S SIX VOTES

Great Britain did not "put over" the votes of her colonies. On the contrary, she had some misgivings about letting her colonies (now officially called "nations") namely, Canada, Australia, India, South Africa and New Zealand get these votes, for fear that they might sometimes display antagonism to the mother country and so weaken the already slender thread by

which her dominions are tied to the mother country; for, within a league embracing all the great powers, the dominions would be secure without the power of Great Britain behind them. And this has actually proved to be the case; Britain's power threatens, if anything, to be lessened, rather than increased, by the five votes, just as it will surely be lessened by the seventh vote when, as will soon happen, the new Irish Free State gets a vote! Moreover these so-called six British votes are not in the Council of course but in the Assembly of 52 nations. The Assembly has very little power as compared with the little power of the Council and in the Council the British Empire has one vote only. Were the question of relative voting strength in the Assembly worth serious argument it might be pointed out that votes are provided for Cuba, Panama, Liberia, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador and Costa Rica, all more likely, in general, to follow the lead of the United States than would Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and Ireland be to follow the lead of England.

Moreover, at Paris it was found that the British dominions had interests and views more sympathetic with ours than with those of the mother country.

By staying out of the League and having no voice or veto, we are now at the mercy of the nations who are members, should they unanimously take some action or adopt some policy against our interest. And we not only forfeit our vote on action hostile to our interests but may even encourage it, as our aloofness is already being regarded as an unfriendly attitude. We are running the risk of creating a new alignment of international feeling, a world's resentment against the United States, and, by keeping out of the League, we deprive ourselves of the most effective method of safeguarding our interests. Thus the decisions on the mandated islands (Yap, etc.) of the Pacific against which the United States Government protested could not have been made, if we had accepted our seat at the League table; nor in all probability would the Near East conditions, now embarrassing the whole world, the United States included, have come to such a critical point if we had had a voice in the League and so had had an opportunity to insist on bringing the Near East questions before the League. In short the six vote bogey is a bogey and nothing more. To be scared away from joining the League by that bogey results merely in depriving us of our rightful veto power and

so puts us at the very disadvantage complained of.

INCONSISTENT OBJECTIONS

The League cannot at once be a dangerous menace and a harmless futility. In the speech of a certain senator in 1920 on the League he referred to it as "binding us hand and foot" and, a few paragraphs later, as a useless, futile "rope of sand"! What a chance for some cartoonist to picture the League bringing calamity to Uncle Sam by binding him hand and foot with a rope of sand! Another senator in a newspaper article in January of this year stated in one passage that the League was a "futility" and in another that it was a super-state.

The League does not prevent existing boundaries from being changed but only prevents their being changed *by a particular method*—the war method, or, in the words of Article X, "external aggression." In fact, it expressly provides the needed machinery for changing boundaries in dispute by arbitration or by treaty or even by *in*ternal aggression, i.e., revolution. In some of these ways the League has already settled several territorial and boundary disputes, as that between Sweden and Finland over the Aaland Islands, that between Germany

and Poland over Upper Silesia, that between Jugo Slavia and Albania, and that between Persia and Soviet Russia, in the latter of which Article X was involved.

Some of those who professed to object to the League because it "stereotyped" boundaries cited the case of Ireland. They did not want the United States to help England prevent Ireland from separating off. It is worth noting that Ireland has been separated and the League did not interfere. In fact it could not have interfered, had it wished.

If the nations were to admit that boundaries might be changed by *force*, the door would be opened to disorder and war.

MONROE DOCTRINE

When the first draft of the League Covenant was submitted, the chief objection brought forward by its opponents was that it interfered with the Monroe Doctrine. It did not do so. But, at the suggestion of ex-President Taft to President Wilson, a specific recognition of the Monroe Doctrine was inserted in the final draft, in order to silence criticism. Consequently, thanks to the League Covenant, the Monroe Doctrine is now a recognized part of international law, subscribed to by 52 nations,

some of whom were previously inclined to question it.

ARTICLE X

But the critics, when thus forced, very unwillingly, to drop the Monroe Doctrine objections, next complained, instead, of Article X, although previously it had scarcely been mentioned as objectionable, and although, as ex-President Taft and President Wilson both pointed out, Article X *is* a kind of Monroe Doctrine extended to the whole world! Article X states that members "undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members"; while the Monroe Doctrine means that the United States undertakes to respect and preserve, as against European aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of American nations. Now the only differences between Article X and the Monroe Doctrine are two, that Article X applies to the whole world instead of to one hemisphere and that, under Article X, the obligation is mutual instead of one-sided; i.e., the United States would under Article X not only have an obligation to respect and preserve but would enjoy a right to respect

and preservation, whereas under the Monroe Doctrine we have no such right.

In short, the critics first insisted that the Monroe Doctrine should be inserted specifically, and then they asked that it be taken out in general!

The second paragraph of Article X reads "in case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of any aggression, *the Council shall advise* upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." This all-important sentence was inserted expressly to avoid any misuse of the article, and as the vote of the Council must be unanimous to be considered at all, *this sentence would give us a veto power on any suggestion for using Article X in which we did not concur.* One of the best English authorities on the League declares that the only obligation in Article X is the obligation of the Council to advise. The individual nations are then free to follow or reject this advice as they see fit.

Article X is little more than a re-statement of President Wilson's fourteenth "point" on the basis of which (with the other "points") the Armistice was agreed upon and the treaty of peace negotiated. This fourteenth point read: "A general Association of Nations must

be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

When this fourteenth point was first enunciated, in fact until long after the League Covenant itself was published, there was little or no criticism of the idea. The violation of the political independence and territorial integrity of Belgium was the outstanding lesson of the war. The fourteenth point and its embodiment in the League Covenant as Article X simply served notice that no future Germany should repeat that outrage.

FORCE BACK OF MONROE DOCTRINE AS WELL AS ARTICLE X

It should not be overlooked that there is just as much threat of force in the Monroe Doctrine as in Article X of the League Covenant. The Monroe Doctrine would be sadly impaired if we were to-day to serve notice that, while we are willing to express a pious wish that Europe would respect the territorial integrity and political independence of the Central and South American nations, we must have it distinctly understood that we are under no obligation to back up our pious wish by force!

Oddly enough, John Quincy Adams did say something very much like this, but the doctrine gained strength and in these latter days was, it is believed, a bulwark against Colonial designs of Germany because under Cleveland and Roosevelt Europe came to believe that we felt a moral obligation to employ force if need be. When Roosevelt clashed with the Kaiser over the Monroe Doctrine, Germany had long wished to break it down. Germany planned to intervene in Venezuela. Roosevelt protested to the German Ambassador, who replied that the Kaiser had cast the die and so it was too late to protest, as "the Kaiser never changes his mind." Thereupon Roosevelt said that American warships would be ordered to Venezuela at once. The Kaiser changed his mind!

Similarly, Grover Cleveland had kept England out of Venezuela.

In both the Cleveland and Roosevelt cases we were saved the use of force because we were known to be willing, if need be, to use it. And these were not exceptional instances. For a full century, since the time of Monroe, we never once had to fire a shot *because it was believed we were ready to do so,* and, it may be added, because it was known that England supported

the Monroe Doctrine and might coöperate with us in maintaining it by force, if need be.

It will be remembered that President Wilson has maintained that Article X was the "heart of the Covenant." The basic idea of Article X is certainly the heart of the Monroe Doctrine. It is interesting to observe Roosevelt's vigorous statement back as far as 1914: "That nations should agree on certain rights that should not be questioned, such as their territorial integrity . . . all should guarantee each of their number in the possession of these rights." That is precisely the object of Article X. Moreover, Roosevelt repeatedly emphasized the need of having force understood to be in the background to make guaranties effective.

Is it not true, however, the inveterate objector continues, that Article X morally binds us to police the whole world? We certainly are not "morally bound" to bear alone the burden of policing the whole world. That burden must, of course, be distributed. Such distribution and joint action is of the very essence of the League. As Roosevelt said in his 1919 article: "We do not wish to undertake the responsibility of sending our gallant young men to die in obscure fights in the Balkans, or in Central Europe, or in a war we do not approve

of." This was written before Article X was finally framed. By an unreasonable interpretation of Article X it has been alleged that it pledged us to such absurdities. But, however one might have argued in 1919, the actual interpretation of Article X in three years' experience of the League has not justified these fears and the recent plan approved by the League Council for zoning the world (originally suggested by W. J. Bryan and later by Nicholas Murray Butler and Samuel Colcord) would specifically remove the possibility of such perversions and would leave to the United States, under ordinary circumstances, little more than the obligations already assumed under the Monroe Doctrine, or, practically, just what Roosevelt suggests in his article.

This plan of Lord Robert Cecil has been compared to the system of fire alarms by which the first alarm only calls on the fire engine nearest the fire, the second on the next nearest and so on until the fifth alarm calls out all the fire fighting forces. In case of a Balkan war, we would be on fifth alarm, so to speak. This would mean the world of course—and we would then have to assist, league or no league, as we had to in 1917. But the difference would be that, if we were in the League, any such

fifth call would be *far less likely to occur* than if we were outside, since the mere fact that we stood ready to come in would prevent some unruly state ever again trying, as Germany did, to put might above right.

As to the other "objections," the contentions that the League is a rope of sand and that it would tend to create wars, can best be discussed when we come to look at the actual experience with the League; while the contentions that it would crush the hopes of Ireland and that it would oppress Germany will be considered in a moment, after referring to the part that German-American and Irish-American votes played in the election of 1920.

WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY NOW FOR THE LEAGUE

Many readers will say, at this point, "These answers to objections sound very well; but Senator So and So feels that they are real objections and, with millions of people, I follow him."

But, if we must follow the crowd, we shall find, in this case, that Senator So and So and his followers are in the minority in the world to-day.

The truth is that our nation now stands almost alone in this matter. This was not true

when, in 1920, public opinion was being formed on the League issue; but to-day the population embraced by the League includes four-fifths of the world's population.

EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES

And even in the United States there is probably, at this moment, not a majority actually against the League. Besides those who voted the Democratic ticket in 1920, millions voted the Republican ticket because they followed Taft, Hughes, Hoover, Root and the rest of the "31" who predicted that we should get into the League through the Republican administration. As Samuel Colcord, a Republican, has pointed out in "The Great Deception," the significance of the 1920 landslide has been misunderstood.

ANALYSIS OF THE 1920 VOTE

A mathematical analysis of the vote by states (published in the New York *Times*, March 6, 1921) shows a high correspondence between the "hyphen" vote and the Republican gain. Thus, the greater the percentage of German-Americans, Austrian-Americans, Irish-Americans or Italian-Americans in any state the more, in general, the Republicans gained in that state

as compared with 1916; that is, this "hyphen" element and the Republican gain were "highly correlated." In figures, the correlation (in the "Pearson scale") was 48 per cent, representing about as close a correspondence as exists between the lengths and breadths of human faces. The detailed figures thus prove conclusively that "the Harding landslide" largely consisted of German-, Irish- and Italian-Americans. The reasons for their action were that they were angered respectively over the severe terms imposed by the Treaty of Versailles on Germany, the unwillingness of President Wilson to present the case of Ireland at Paris and the fact that he did not favor letting Italy take Fiume.

But these objections should be directed against the Treaty of Versailles. They are not essentially objections to the League of Nations as such, *although by a natural confusion of ideas the League was associated with the other parts of the Treaty of Versailles.* Thus the German-American thought of the League as an instrument for enforcing the reparations, although the Reparation Commission is not under the League at all but under the Supreme Council of the Allies. The Irish-American thought of the League as a British contrivance

and so as anti-Irish. To these false ideas was added the curious confusion of the Supreme Council of the Allies with the Council of the League, which two councils are about as much alike as "cat and category." Yet just such confusions played a great part in the 1920 campaign.

The prejudices then aroused are still strong, although much weaker than in 1920. As a matter of fact, if America had been in the League, the *reparations* (though not in charge of the League at all) might have been modified and put on a practical basis long ago, much to the advantage of Germany, while Ireland likewise would have gained exactly what she sought —a hearing; for the League expressly provides that "It is also declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."

In fact, at the moment these lines were being written, while France was taking possession of the Ruhr, the newspapers reported that, in Sweden and in England (through a thousand meetings of labor unions especially), there were

agitations to present the Reparations question to the League Council. It is rather late in the day to do this, but the proposal to do it illustrates how instinctively men's thoughts turn to the League as the chief hope for averting war, and how easily, in the early stages, America might have used the League, had she been in it, to lessen the chances of injustice and war over the Reparations question.

The League offers a rostrum from which any nation, if a member of the League, can appeal to the world. Certain Indian tribes were recently in Washington trying to get Switzerland or Holland to bring their dispute with Canada to the League.

England brought to the League the Aaland Islands dispute between Sweden and Finland; so, if we had been a member, we could have brought the case of Germany or the case of Ireland. The League will give to Ireland, especially after she joins it, a forum which she may yet need in adjusting her treaty rights with Great Britain. She will also need a powerful friend in the League. Could she have a better one than the United States? Evidently what President Wilson deemed inexpedient to attempt at Paris when negotiating the Peace Treaty with England among the rest, could

have been soon accomplished at Geneva, had we joined the League.

There can be no question, then, that "the Harding landslide" represented to a very large extent a *foreign sympathy* vote related directly to the Treaty of Versailles, but only indirectly and, withal, mistakenly to the League.

It may well be, of course, that, even without the "hyphen" vote, Harding would have been elected by a comfortable majority. But it would not have been by the 14 per cent majority which he actually got but perhaps by the 5 per cent majority which Taft got in 1908 or the 2 per cent majority of McKinley in 1896, or the 1 per cent majority of Wilson in 1916.

Even if we assume that *all* of the 14 per cent of the voters by which the Republicans won were anti-League and that *half* of their normal 50 per cent (i.e., 25 per cent of the electorate) were anti-League,—surely excessive figures in each case—we can thereby muster only 39 per cent of the total as having been opposed to the League. It seems more reasonable to conclude that the League opponents numbered less than 33 per cent of the voters.

LEAGUE QUESTION NOT SETTLED

After the Harding Administration was elected, the pro-League Republicans pursued the policy for two years of keeping silent in order to "give the Administration a chance" and asked the pro-League Democrats and Independents to do likewise, and rescue the question from politics. This was an important object. But silence had one unfortunate effect. It gave the chance to the irreconcilable senators to convince the general public that they had made the issues and dominated the campaign and that the unprecedented Republican majority was their vindication and an endorsement of their position.

Finally, even were it true that the majority of the people of the United States thought in 1920, or think in 1923, that the United States ought not to participate in what all the rest of the world is doing through the League of Nations, the Irreconcilables could not justly claim that the matter should be considered settled,—as *"res adjudicata."* If the evidence presented was wrong or new evidence and new reasons for joining the League have been found, the people of the United States have a right to re-hear the case. These two things are exactly

what we find. We have seen that the reasons which led many to oppose the League—whether these be, as the Irreconcilables would have us believe, a majority, or, as careful students of the election of 1920 believe, a minority,—are, to a very large extent, based on misunderstanding. Some opposed the League because they had received the false impression that Roosevelt opposed it; some because they had received the false impression that it was unconstitutional, impaired our sovereignty, was a super-government, could order our soldiers abroad, gave Britain, through the five votes of her colonies, power to control the League action, which the United States would be helpless to prevent, that the League Covenant and the Treaty of Versailles are the same and that to enter the League involves accepting the Treaty, that the Reparation Commission was under the League Council, that the League Council and the Supreme Council of the Allies were one and the same, that the League was a machine for crushing Germany and Ireland, that the League and the Treaty did not harmonize with the Monroe Doctrine, that the League countenanced the white slave traffic, that it was an entangling alliance in the sense supposed to be decried by Washington, that it would cause

wars, that it would have made the American Revolution impossible.

It ill becomes those of the Irreconcilables who helped create these wrong conceptions of the League now to say that "the question is settled." The American people have a right to know the truth and to change their minds when they find that they had at first based their opinions on erroneous information.

Moreover, even if there were League opponents who were under none of these illusions in 1920, the events of the last two and a half years may have presented to them reasons for joining the League which did not exist in 1920 and removed some of the reasons for not joining it. The League has been divorced from the Treaty so that, like any neutral, we can now join the League without having to subscribe to the Treaty.

The Treaty killed the League in 1920 because the people confused the two. Since 1920 experience has shown that the Treaty was far more faulty and the League far less faulty than first supposed. The most sympathetic friends of France are beginning to see that Professor J. Maynard Keynes was right in pointing out the need of revising the Reparations to make their payment practicable. What

needs next to be clearly understood is that *the only substantial hope of ever reaching a practical revision is through the League of Nations.* So far from being a jailor for inflicting cruel and unusual punishments on Germany, it is a tribunal of justice to prevent Germany's chief victim in the war from revengefully applying the thumbscrews too vigorously. Not only every sensible German-American but every "100 per cent American" who wants to find a just and pacific escape from the present *impasse* should look to the League as the only hope in sight. The fact that the League is helping Austria demonstrates that it could be used to help Germany.

Again, the virtual separation of Ireland from Britain and her intention to join the League demonstrates that we could help her also—inside the League. In short, the facts that Europe is sinking rather than recovering, that the foreign market for our farmers is being ruined, that the Turk is reasserting his influence in Europe, that France and England are drifting apart, that Germany and Russia are drifting together and that France has occupied the Ruhr, all beckon us again to save Europe from destruction.

The effort any longer to think of the League

question as "settled" is fast proving ridiculous. Great questions are seldom really settled until they are settled right. Let us remember that the slavery question was once "settled" by the Missouri compromise. But, much to the surprise of the politicians, it didn't stay settled. If there is anything clear to all who are not, ostrich-like, burying their heads in the sand, it is that isolation, at this time, is no settlement at all.

In short, the League question, in a new form, is now before us.

VIII. THE SENATE IRRECONCILABLES

WHY DO NOT OTHER NATIONS FIND FAULT?

WE see, then, that the League question must be reconsidered, that the numerous objections which have been alleged against the League will not bear examination on their merits, that the people have a right and a duty to correct any false first impressions of the League, that among the false impressions is that a majority voted against it, that there are now appearing new circumstances and new reasons compelling us to think better of the League, that even in the Senate only a minority voted against it.

But, unfortunately, that minority, being slightly greater than one-third of the Senate, has had the power, under our Constitution, to block our entrance into the League.

It is no part of the purpose of this book to apportion personal praise and blame, especially as to do so would merely re-arouse the political passions which we wish to avoid and forget. But, as the aim is to convince every reasonable

reader that the entrance of the United States into the League of Nations is essential for the good both of the United States and of Europe, we cannot altogether avoid reference to the reasons for the opposition.

Let those who have taken the Senators' objections seriously ask themselves these questions: If their arguments are sound, why are these arguments not felt in the other 52 countries—by Great Britain, France, Italy or Canada, for instance?

If the League *really* damages the sovereignty of a member, why has not England or France or any other member discovered this? Is their national pride one whit less than ours? If the separate votes of the British colonies or "nations" are *really* unfair and a menace to other nations, why have not France and the other countries than our own discovered it and objected? Surely they are no more ready to give something for nothing than we are.

If, because of "British control," the League is *really* anti-Irish, why is Ireland herself expected to join the League next September?

If the League would *really* cause our American mothers to sacrifice their boys fighting abroad, would it not bring the same calamity to the mothers in England, France, Canada or the

Argentine? Are we to suppose that they love their sons less or, with all their experience which some of them have had in losing sons in the war, do not yet realize what war means?

If the League *really* stereotypes the boundaries in Europe, why have not France, Italy and, in fact, all those whose boundaries are affected discovered the fact and refused to enter?

If the Monroe Doctrine which we developed to safeguard our South and Central American neighbors was ever *really* endangered by the League (even before Article XXI was inserted to safeguard it) why did not those neighbors (the supposed beneficiaries of the doctrine) discover the fact and object?

If the League is *really* so utterly wrong as to be required to be "scrapped" in favor of a new "Association," why have not other nations suggested this, instead of joining, one after another, over a period of four years, the existing League without reservations?

If Article X is *really* dangerous why has not every other country also discovered that it is dangerous to itself? In fact, Canada, who proposed to eliminate Article X (which she did presumably only to conciliate the United States), has, as yet, found no support in the

League for such action, although the Council is submitting this proposal to the members of the League for reply before July first next together with the following suggested amendment of interpretation:

> "The opinion given by the council in such cases shall be regarded as of the highest importance and shall be taken into consideration by all members of the league, who shall use their utmost endeavors to conform to the conclusions of the council. But no member shall be under obligation to engage in any active war without the consent of its parliament, legislature or other representative body."

Unless the questions above enumerated can be answered, is there not something very suspicious about all these objections; even if we do not take the trouble to find out where the fallacy of each lies?

WHY DID THE IRRECONCILABLE SENATORS FIND FAULT?

Yet millions of Americans have not even asked themselves such questions and, if they should do so, would still ask, "But do you think that a patriotic statesman like Senator So and So would stoop so low as to play politics beyond the water's edge and allege an argument against the League which was not sound? What object

would he have in doing so? These good people do not realize how, when great political or personal interests are at stake, a man can find excuses for himself and, under "Freudian psychology," act from unworthy motives subconsciously without admitting their existence even to his conscious self. Be it remembered that when the Hayes-Tilden election was referred to the Supreme Court, that august body, composed of the finest exponents of justice in the world, voted to a man in accordance with the previous political affiliations of its members!

If the reader still has doubts, let him ask himself why it is that the irreconcilable Senate minority are the only statesmen in the world who have alleged such objections; why it happens that the only Senators who objected were, each and every one, political or personal opponents of the President; why they were so eager to set public opinion against the League even before they had seen a draft of the League Covenant; why they refused to follow the example of Taft, Hughes, Root and Lowell in submitting constructive criticism when offered the opportunity; why their alleged objections were often inconsistent with each other and with the previous expressions of the objector. Why did one Senator appeal to Race Hatred

and say that the black, yellow and brown races would control the League? Why did another Senator appeal to Irish Prejudice and say that England would run it? Why did another Senator appeal to Religious Prejudice and say that Catholics would run the League and that it did not mention God in the Covenant? Why did another Senator appeal to the anti-Wall Street Prejudice and say that the League was a Capitalist Plot of Wall Street? Why did another Senator appeal to anti-Japanese Prejudice and say that Japan would gain entrance to America under it? Why did another Senator appeal to the German-American element and say that the League would oppress Germany? Why did another Senator appeal to the Italian-American element? Why did the time of all these tactics and the change in attitude from friendliness to opposition appear only with the approach of a presidential election?

Each reader may answer these questions for himself and as he sees fit. I am confining myself to setting forth the facts. Among these facts are several instances of editors and other molders of public opinion confessing early in 1919 that they had been requested "for political purposes" to withdraw their advocacy of the League and oppose it instead, and that the

wholesale discrediting of the League dated from that time.

COOLIDGE ON THE LEAGUE

Prior to that date there had been very little opposition and many political opponents of the President were outspoken in praise of this new effort to prevent war.

Vice President Coolidge (then Governor of Massachusetts), in an address of welcome at Boston to President Wilson on his first return from France, in February, 1919, said:

> "We have welcomed him with a reception more marked even than that which was accorded to General George Washington, more united than could have been given at any time of his life to President Abraham Lincoln.
>
> "We welcome him as the representative of a great people, as a great statesman, as one to whom we have entrusted our destinies and one whom we surely will support in the future in the working out of these destinies, as Massachusetts has supported him in the past."

If such support had been accorded, President Wilson would really seem to be another George Washington, or Lincoln, and the Democratic party might have won the election and, like the Republican party after the Civil War, have stayed in power for a generation. The political

stake was therefore high. The personal stakes of certain Senators ambitious for the Presidency were also high and the stake of the prestige of the Senate's prerogative in giving "advice and consent" to the President was also supposed to be high. These stakes could scarcely be won without discrediting President Wilson and that could scarcely be assured without discrediting his chief claim for credit.

It will be recalled that Roosevelt said, in 1910: "The ruler or statesman who should bring about such a combination would have earned his place in history for all time and his title to the gratitude of all mankind."

All this is pointed out merely to show how high the stakes were and how inevitable it was that many honorable men, sincerely desiring world peace, should, even unconsciously, find it easy to find fault with, and seek some substitute for, the League, knowing that to do otherwise might cost them or their party or the Senate's prestige, or all three, so dear.

SUBCONSCIOUS FAULT-FINDING

It is not the purpose here to discuss President Wilson. No man's personal fortunes or reputation are worth discussion in the face of the colossal question of preventing war. There-

fore the only question at this point is, when the little band of Senators thus discredited the League, from whatever motives, were they serving the highest interest of the United States? I have tried, so far as is consistent with telling the facts, to avoid impugning motives. It may well be that those who "killed the League" little realized what they did, or did not understand that subtle subconscious working in their own minds of party, senatorial and personal prejudice, or, in some cases, had reasons which have not yet been fathomed. But, whatever the motives, the record of facts stands as stated.

REPUBLICANS WHO HELPED

After this painful recital, it is a pleasure to emphasize the fact that some of the bitterest opponents of President Wilson stood by the League to the end. It has been seen that Roosevelt, just before he died (which, be it not forgotten, was several weeks before the first draft of the League Covenant had been drawn up), expressed approval "in principle" and confidence that "the details" could doubtless be arranged so that agreement could be reached. In February, 1919, the first and tentative draft of the League was published and opportunity

was given to all to submit criticisms. Ex-President Taft offered five amendments; Elihu Root, nine; Charles E. Hughes, seven. President Lowell also submitted suggestions, as did Senator Hitchcock. All of these were constructive and most of them were incorporated in the final draft.

Ex-President Taft never allowed his party affiliations to cause him actually to oppose the League. He said:

"When President Wilson brought to this country the League Covenant, as reported to the Paris Conference, I urged, on the same platform with him, that we join the League. I thereafter recommended amendments, many of which were adopted into its final form. Had I been in the Senate, I would have voted for the League and Treaty as submitted; and I advocated its ratification accordingly. I did not think, and I do not now think, that anything in the League Covenant as sent to the Senate would violate the Constitution of the United States or would involve us in wars which it would not be to the highest interest of the world and the country to suppress by universal boycott, and, if need be, by military force. I consider that the moral effect of Article X on predatory nations would restrain them from war as the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine has done and that the requirement of the unanimous consent by the representatives of the Great Powers in council before League action would safeguard the United States from any perversion of the high pur-

poses of the League. Moreover, I believe that the issue of the League transcends in its importance any domestic issues and would justify and require one who believes so to ignore party ties and secure this great boon for the world and this country."

(Later, in an editorial entitled "Apologia" in the *Public Ledger,* ex-President Taft, after quoting his words above, explained that he did not desert his party, because there was a better chance to enter the League under its banner than under that of the opposing party.)

THE IRRECONCILABLES THE SOLE SOURCE OF OPPOSITION

The truth is practically all of the opposition to the League originated among the few Senate Irreconcilables. Unlike Taft, Root, Hughes and Lowell, they made their clamors vocal and insistent, in season and out of season, and, also unlike them, they possessed the power, through the franking privilege, to disseminate their propaganda through every nook and cranny of the land. The only voice loudly raised against them was one, that of the President, and that voice was soon stilled by illness. The great progress made by the little band of irreconcilable Senators in affecting public opin-

ion is thus a testimony to the power of persistent and loud advertising.

It is clear that the contest reduced itself, in the end, to a contest between the White House and the Senate, or rather a pivotal minority in the Senate. This was really an ancient contest, as is well shown in the article by ex-Governor and ex-Congressman Samuel W. McCall of Massachusetts (a staunch Republican) in the *Atlantic Monthly,* for September, 1920. He pointed out that the Senate had usually been in the wrong in obstructing treaties and sounded a warning against its growing encroachments on the executive.

Of course, in this case, this old contest between two branches of our Government was fiercer than usual for two reasons, namely, first, that the Treaty was the most important ever negotiated, while the Senate had little or no participation in the negotiations, and second, that the Senate was of opposite political faith to the White House. The Lodge "round-robin" expressly states as the grievance that the Senators' prerogatives of "advice and consent" had been slighted.

ROOSEVELT'S COMMENTS

It is interesting to note the comments of Roosevelt, in the recently revealed talks with his physician, Dr. John H. Richards, just before Roosevelt died. In the *Saturday Evening Post*, December 9, 1922, Dr. Richards is quoted as having said:

"I asked Colonel Roosevelt whether he would have gone to France when Wilson did, had he been President. He said: 'If I had had a hostile Senate I would have gone, but with a committee appointed by that Senate. That would have taken the whole matter out of politics and would have left me in the best possible position under the circumstances. Wilson reminds me of Cowper, who could write fine English, but who knew nothing of the human nature of which he was writing. If Wilson had known anything of human nature he would not have conducted himself as he did.' "

Incidentally, be it noted that this statement, while primarily a criticism of President Wilson, assumes, as a matter of course, the hostility and politics-playing of some Senators.

CONCLUSION

We now see clearly (what at first glance seems so inexplicable) why America differed so from any other country in the world in its action (or lack of action) on the League. It was simply and solely because *we had a deadlocked government.* The President negotiated the Treaty; the Senate failed to ratify because of hostility to the President—not great enough to blind all Republicans but great enough, with the help of his personal enemies in his own party, to block the President. Only by perceiving and understanding that struggle can we understand how far many Americans missed the real point of the League and how misled was public opinion. The public, by bitter experience, is now gradually waking up to these facts.

With this new awakening and with the new and startling developments, day after day, in Europe, the country is now ready to resume the study of the League *on its merits* and without being be-clouded by politics.

Under Mr. Justice Clarke and ex-Attorney General Wickersham a "League of Nations Non-Partisan Association" has been formed.

Mr. Justice Clarke said in his opening address for this Association:

> "The mistake made in 1920 of permitting the question whether the United States should enter the League of Nations to become an issue of party politics has already proved a great misfortune. If this error be not speedily corrected, it will result in permanent disaster to our country. The subject never had a fair hearing in the United States, for, as soon as it appeared, it became immersed in party politics with all the misinterpretation and misrepresentation which that implies."

My one and only object in this chapter and the preceding is to show that the fundamental reasons for the opposition were not real faults in the League.

It is said that when two Roman Augurs met each other they could not keep straight faces. It may soon happen that when people mention the objections of the "six British votes," of the "Super-Government," the robbing us of "sovereignty," etc., we shall be unable to keep straight faces.

IX. EXPERIENCE WITH THE LEAGUE

VERDICT OF VISITORS

We see, then, that hitherto the League has not been fairly before the people. Now that it can be considered on its merits, we have the great advantage of having before us three years' experience. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The League has been tried and has not been found wanting. It has, it is true, not brought the Millennium; it has not saved Europe from chaos in many parts; it has not solved the greatest problems the war left behind, such as the Reparation problem and the problem of international debts generally, or such as the problem of the Turk in Europe and that of the Dardanelles. There are very many things it has *not* yet done. But it must be judged by what it *has* done. What it has done fills every fair-minded observer with astonishment and admiration. When we consider that it started under the worst of auspices, born in the turmoil, distress and distrust of 1919, re-

garded by most political functionaries with suspicion and jealousy as an interloper, without even the moral support of the greatest and most impartial of all nations, the League has, in the short space of three years, achieved results to be reckoned among the greatest achieved in all human history. This needs emphasis, as so few people have followed what the League *has* done, while the newspapers are full of what it has *not* done. This is natural and inevitable; for a real war between Greece and Turkey is more sensational than the prevention of a war between Sweden and Finland. We must not forget that the newspapers are always full of sensational stories of *breaking* the law but seldom feature the daily doings of the Supreme Court in *preserving* the law.

Those of our own people who have visited the League Secretariat at Geneva or attended the sessions there of the Council or Assembly have invariably and inevitably come away filled with admiration and approval. Senator McKinley of Illinois, a Republican, after observing the League at first hand, remarked, according to the newspapers, "America must join this some day; only the name must be changed."

A SWEDEN-FINLAND WAR PREVENTED

The League had but just been started when Great Britain, under Article XI, declaring it the "friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends," asked the League to mediate between Sweden and Finland in the Aaland Islands dispute.

This exercise of the newly created "friendly right" marks an epoch in history, for without such encouragement, a third party always hesitates to seem to meddle in a quarrel between two other nations. When recently Secretary Hughes was asked why he didn't intervene between Greece and Turkey, he replied that the United States had not been invited. Had we been a member of the League we should have had a standing invitation and could have seized many an opportunity to accept it, long before the Greco-Turkish war had gotten under way enough to have attracted newspaper attention. Great Britain herself did not, in the Greco-Turkish affair, come forward as she did

in the Sweden-Finland matter for reasons not altogether creditable to Great Britain; for, in this case, she was not an impartial outsider as was the United States. Had we been in the League a fifth war would, in all probability, have been prevented.

To return to the Finland dispute, the Aaland Islands were of vital concern to both countries. They were claimed by Sweden because their population was chiefly Swedish and by Finland because, before the war, they had been a part of the Russian Duchy of Finland.

At a special meeting of the League's Council held in London, the representatives of Sweden and Finland solemnly pledged their nations to refrain from war until the League's award had been made. The award (chiefly in Finland's favor) was fully accepted by both nations. The League then called a conference of ten nations which provided for keeping the islands unfortified and neutral under the auspices of the League so as to remove all chance of their becoming again a bone of contention.

This first case of mediation by the League is full of important lessons. It shows how the World War could have been averted in 1914 if the League had then existed so that Sir Edward Grey, instead of vainly endeavoring to build up

the machinery for a conference, could merely have sent one telegram to the League Council regarding Austria and Serbia. It shows also how the League performed all of the three essential functions previously noted as fundamental reasons for a League of Nations, namely: first the function of "finishing the job" left by the war (which had allowed Finland and the Aaland Islands to separate from Russia and so created the problem of to whom the islands belonged); secondly, of reducing armaments; and thirdly, of preventing war.

WAR OVER UPPER SILESIA PREVENTED

It is especially noteworthy that the League also settled the vexed question of Upper Silesia *after every other means had been tried and had failed.* The Supreme Council of the Allies, left over from the war, tried to settle the Silesian question, but because of the deadlock between Lloyd George and Briand gave it up and turned it over to the League of Nations. This very fact that the Supreme Council of the Allies, representing huge military power, voluntarily referred this "hopeless case" to the League Council, representing no military power at all, is, of itself, of tremendous significance. Moreover, the Supreme Council agreed in advance to

accept whatever decision was reached. Everybody concerned drew a sigh of relief; for it meant that war had been averted.

It has been said that the Upper Silesian settlement of the League of Nations was not satisfactory to everybody and was very unsatisfactory to some. The truth is that no settlement could possibly have been very satisfactory. That is why it was hard to reach any settlement. So mixed was the population of the disputed area that the plebiscite indicated no clear boundary between the German and Polish parts of Upper Silesia but left islands, as it were, of one nationality surrounded by an ocean of the other. The first effort was to get an *impartial* study. A Japanese presided over the Council meetings, the preliminary boundary line was drawn by the Chinese, Brazilian, Spanish and Belgian members of the Council and the economic experts were a Czecho-Slovakian and a Swiss.

The recommendation of the League Council was accepted by the Principal Allied Powers and subsequently by Poland and by Germany. Here again we see how essential was the League to wind up a war-wrought problem.

But the important point is that a *settlement was reached without war* and, as the most dis-

satisfied well know, reached by persons who did their best to do justice. Had the League not settled the Silesian question, war, involving France, as well as England, would almost inevitably have come, and, had war come, two evils would have come with it besides the war itself, namely, (1) a settlement far more one-sided, unjust and unsatisfactory than that actually reached through the League, and (2) a consequent rankling resentment, which would probably have led to a second war to reverse the results of the first.

This action of the League, sometimes regarded as its least successful action, is emphasized, because it seems to illustrate most effectively just what the League can do to avoid war. Courts are chiefly valuable not because they render perfect justice (for no human agency can do that), but because, after doing their best to approximate justice, they *dispose of their cases* and avert bloodshed.

WAR BETWEEN ALBANIA AND JUGO-SLAVIA PREVENTED

The third success of the League in avoiding war was in the boundary dispute between Albania and Jugo-Slavia. The boundary line had never been definitely fixed after the World

War. Jugo-Slavia became impatient and finally decided—as so many an individual is tempted to do after experiencing the law's delays—to take matters into its own hands, to use the "war method" because the "law method" did not seem to work fast enough.

At this stage, Lloyd George telegraphed the League that the "continued advance of Jugo-Slav forces into Albania, being of nature to disturb international peace, His Majesty's Government desires to call the attention of the Council thereto and requests that you will take immediate steps to summon meeting of the Council to consider situation and to agree upon measure to be taken under Article XVI in the event of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government refusing to execute their obligations under the Covenant."

If the reader will consult Article XVI he will find that what Lloyd George proposed was an international boycott of Jugo-Slavia (the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom) !

Consternation reigned. Jugo-Slav exchange fell. The loan which Jugo-Slavia was negotiating was refused. The Jugo-Slav representative in the League protested and stated that the Jugo-Slav troops entered Albania only in counter-attacks, but promised that the troops

would be withdrawn (and they were) and that whatever boundary line was decided upon by the League would be respected (and it was).

FIGHTING BETWEEN POLAND AND LITHUANIA STOPPED

The fourth effort has not yet been so fully successful as the three so far mentioned.

This fourth case was that of Poland and Lithuania, also a quarrel over an undefined boundary. Each claimed a wide stretch of territory on the border. Actual hostilities commenced. But, instead of declaring war, each nation appealed to the League as the only hope of averting war. At this very moment a Polish general nearly spoiled all chance of a peaceful settlement by marching into Vilna. Had it not been that the League offered a ray of hope, war would have been inevitable. Poland disclaimed responsibility for her general's rash act, and the League proposed that his army be replaced by an international police force. Be it noted, as Mr. Sweetser says:

> "No nation was commanded, or could be commanded, to send troops, but several European nations were invited to do so. Great Britain, France, and Belgium, former belligerents, promptly complied, and what is more important, certain former neu-

trals who had remained coolly aloof during the war, agreed to coöperate in this work of public order. Spain and Sweden, for instance, agreed directly; Norway agreed on condition that she could send volunteers; Denmark agreed after approval by her Parliament; the Dutch Parliament discussed the proposal a long time without reaching a decision."

But the troops were never sent, for the reason that the Council finally decided that both disputants put too many obstacles in the way of the plebiscite which it was the object of the international police force to conduct.

So a new method was suggested. After six weeks' effort, however, this failed and another was tried which failed also. Then the Council, having exhausted its own suggestions, referred the matter to the Assembly. But thus far the Assembly has not succeeded in effecting a settlement.

Nevertheless war was averted, or, at any rate, postponed. The "cooling-off" period which the League's efforts brought about accomplished at least that much, and we may at least hope that more complete success will yet be attained.

Later, in February, 1923, as this is being written, the newspapers report that Lithuania has threatened to go to war with Poland if

Poland tried to occupy any portion of the "neutral zone" the government of which the League had been trying to divide temporarily between the two, pending a permanent settlement. Thereupon Viviani, the French representative in the Council, impressed upon the Lithuanian delegate that the boycott might be invoked. This "impressed the Lithuanian delegate considerably, and he withdrew without offering further objections." "The belief was expressed in League circles that the Lithuanians were being encouraged in their resistance by the Russians."

THE LEAGUE LAUNCHES THE COURT

Even more important than the actual prevention of war in the four cases mentioned is the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice which institutes judicial machinery for deciding disputes.

The new Court differs from the old Hague Court. The latter was really only a panel or list of 200 judges who were ready to be called upon by the disputing parties to arbitrate their difficulties. The new Permanent Court of International Justice holds regular, not occasional, sessions and has eleven members who give all their time to the work.

As soon as the Court was constituted it was engaged in giving the Council, at its request, advisory opinions. Just now it is taking up a dispute between Great Britain and France over the nationality laws of Tunis and Morocco. The French claimed the right to conscript British subjects living in Tunis and Morocco and force them to do military service as French citizens. Great Britain protested and the dispute became acute. France at first asserted that the matter was one of her own domestic concern. As the *Westminster Gazette* expressed it: "A deadlock was reached of a kind that, under the old system of international relationship might have had grave consequences. Fortunately the League's machinery was at hand." The two parties have agreed that, if the Court decides that the matter is not solely within the domestic jurisdiction of France, the whole dispute will be referred to arbitration or to judicial settlement.

These details of the Court's work will seldom seem exciting enough to get a place "on the front page" but they stand for questions at issue as grave as those of our Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Clarke, fresh from the latter great tribunal, says, "if it had done nothing more, the

League would have richly justified its existence by the giving of this Court to the world."

Here, at least, is one feature of the League which has not yet become be-clouded by politics. Fortunately it was not in existence in 1920, as a product of the preceding administration, but was something looked forward to as to be born under the auspices of the present administration. President Harding and Secretary Hughes are now, at last, trying to get America officially represented in the Court and we are all hoping to see them succeed. We already have an American on the Court put there by *other* nations. The difficulty standing in the way of official membership is that we are not yet on the roll of the League of Nations; for the Court, as at present provided for, is exclusively the creature of the Council and the Assembly, in which we have no voice. Secretary Hughes hopes that, by special arrangement, we may be given a voice in selecting the judges without our joining the League. He would presumably be glad if we fully joined the League—so he said before he was Secretary of State—but the Senate Irreconcilables stand in the way. By so doing they also stand in the way of our joining the Court.

THE LEAGUE PROMOTES WELFARE

Samples have been given of how the League has proven its value in fulfilling the three functions originally mentioned as making a league essential in this world to-day, viz.:

(1) to help wind up the War, which has left so many and so vital matters at loose ends;
(2) to reduce armaments;
(3) to prevent war.

But, while these are the essential things at the present moment, the fourth function of the League, already important, will, in the long run, become its chief glory. This is the work of the Secretariat (largely) in hygienic, humanitarian and educational ways. After all, the first three functions are purely *negative*, namely to keep civilization from destroying itself. Once we have succeeded in preserving peace, we shall thereafter take peace as a matter of course and be more interested in the *positive* contributions of the League to human progress.

As to health, the League undertook at first to take over the International Health Office at Paris just as it had taken over the International Postal Union, the International Hydrographic

Bureau and so many others of the five hundred international organizations already in existence before the League was born. But the United States, being a member of the Health Office but not a member of the League, assumed an attitude which can most simply be described as that of a dog in the manger, and refused to consent. This compelled the League to content itself with mere coöperation with the old Health Office at Paris through a new Health Office at Geneva. Even with this handicap, the League has accomplished great things in preventing the typhus in Russia and other epidemics spreading from country to country; for, just as our own United States Public Health Service has helped the various states control the spread of disease in America from state to state, so the problem of epidemics spreading from country to country is international and belongs to the League of Nations. When it is remembered that the Influenza Epidemic of 1919 killed more people than did the War and that it presumably entered the United States from Europe, the usefulness of a central clearing house of information which may forewarn in time should be apparent. The work is a little like that of the forester who sights forest fires from the mountain top and telephones the

information, both to help put out the fire where it begins and to help make ready the fire-fighting apparatus for any emergency elsewhere.

The League has helped rescue 400,000 prisoners of war from Russia and Siberia. It has also helped Russian refugees, also Christian women detained in Turkish harems and other women and girls in white slavery. In 1922 forty states ratified the Convention for the suppression of this traffic in women and children. (In 1920 one of the appeals to women voters to oppose the League was that it "recognized" white slavery!) The League has coöperated with the Red Cross in its efforts to bind up the wounds left by the war and to reduce the appalling deaths from underfeeding and lack of medical care.

One of the chief functions of the Secretariat is to register and publish all international treaties which, according to the League Covenant, will not be valid unless so registered and published, thus making secret treaties impossible without bad faith at the start, and making it difficult for any nation to make secret alliances against other nations.

The foregoing list of activities, and the several others mentioned incidentally in other parts of this little book, is by no means com-

plete. They are mere samples of what the seven hundred men and women in the Secretariat are doing at Geneva.

THE LEAGUE HAS A SOUL

Without going further in citing samples we stress the one great fact which impresses every visitor who observes the League at work. This is the great *earnestness* of these devoted men and women.

They have already developed a "League Spirit" of humanitarianism, the highest product of Christianity, and in fact of every other great religion. They have dedicated their lives to the service of Mankind. After all, the real League is to be found in its inner spirit, not in the outer form in which it is contained. Not the wording of the League Covenant but its working is what counts, and its working is the expression of the spirit animating its members and functionaries. That spirit is the spirit of justice, liberty, fraternity, democracy and service.

Once again, it should be asked: Is it not strange that America, which stands for these very ideals more than any other nation, is not yet a member?

THE LEAGUE A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

The League is, in short, eliminating the fighting of man against man and substituting the fighting of man against disease, hunger and poverty. It has created a number of important international conferences to secure better finance and on other subjects. One of the chief virtues of the League is its ability to call such conferences on any special subject of the special nations concerned. It called, for instance, as already noted, the special conference of ten nations to consider the neutralization and demilitarization of the Aaland Islands.

Reparations, International Debts, Stabilization of Currency and Disarmament are perhaps the chief subjects for such conferences to-day. The currency question was discussed at the Brussels conference called by the League, but no effective results have yet been attained because of the relation of stabilization to the Reparations and other international debts, and because of the inability of so many nations to balance their budgets. Much progress has been made in the technical study of disarmament but the plans have been delayed out of deference to the American Government which called the

Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments.

THE LEAGUE SAVES AUSTRIA'S LIFE

Austria appealed to the League, virtually filing a petition in bankruptcy. The League imposed certain conditions, such as Government economies and stopping inflation, with which Austria has now complied. The League has, on its part, arranged for a loan of twenty-six million pounds sterling to Austria. This appeal of Austria seems to be the first case in history where a nation has asked and received such succor, enabling it to make a fresh start. The *Westminster Gazette,* reviewing the League's work on the third anniversary of its birth, says: "The League's greatest achievement—the rescue of Austria from its anarchical state—drew from the Austrian Chancellor the exclamation: 'Thank God, we can say to-day that the League of Nations has not failed us.' " Albania has also received help through the League. These, on a small scale, show what the League might have done to rehabilitate Germany and so help solve the great problem of Reparations, had America joined the League. Such help, of course, is not charity but simply the profitable investment of the

savings of those nations which have savings, by loaning to a nation which needs them and is glad to pay for them.

INTERNATIONALIZED REGIONS AND MANDATES

The League has successfully administered two areas, the Free City of Danzig and the Saar Valley and has virtually put into action the Mandate System. The Mandatory Powers have, with few exceptions, shown their willingness to administer the areas entrusted to their care according to the terms of the Treaty and to submit annual reports to the League.

BALFOUR'S COMMENTS

Mr. Balfour, speaking at the last Assembly on the Secretary General's report, said a glance at its Table of Contents gave striking indication of the extent of the League's activities. He added that if any man, reading that index, should then ask himself the question: "Were the League of Nations abolished to-morrow, what body either exists or could be found which could do these things?" he would answer for him that the questioner would get up from his perusal a convinced and lifelong supporter of the League's work.

COURT OF JUSTICE NOT THE ONLY FEATURE

Some people seem to imagine that the International Court is the only essential part of the League idea, so far as peace preservation goes, and that if the United States joins the Court nothing more is required.

But it will be observed that all of the war prevention thus far achieved by the League was accomplished before the Court existed. The Court cannot act, until the dispute to be settled has approached its last stages, while the Council can handle it in its early stages and the Secretariat may see it coming early enough to prevent it altogether, simply through bringing about an understanding of a situation instead of a misunderstanding. In fact this preventive work nips the troubles so early in the bud that the buds are hard to find and to count. Thus the League is doing much prevention work for which it cannot get credit, since we can never say, in any case, what would have happened without such work.

SUMMARY

From what has been said it is clear

(1) That the League has done no mischief, has caused no wars because of Article

X, has been no super-state, has never impaired or even offended any nation's sovereignty. It has ordered no soldiers, has not compelled any country to go to war against its will, has not stereotyped boundaries, has not crushed the hopes of Ireland, has not been controlled or dominated by Britain's six votes in the Assembly, has not been a means of executing the Treaty against Germany.

(2) That the League has lacked the strength as yet to undertake the major problems of European reconstruction, but has, nevertheless, accomplished wonders in hundreds of unobtrusive ways. It has been no futile "rope of sand."

(3) In particular it has stopped four wars which might otherwise have spread throughout Europe; in three of these cases it has settled the dispute. It has probably prevented a number of other quarrels ever reaching the war stage. It has established what may be considered the highest and most important Court in the world, which will doubtless prevent war in even

more important cases than the four which have been prevented by the Council and Assembly. It has safeguarded labor, health, morals, education, treaty publicity and other great international interests. It has established important commissions to work out plans for disarmament and other objects. It has called important conferences on monetary and other problems; it has cultivated an international spirit of peace and good will.

For a League, in its infancy, born in a world of chaos, with no authority except its merits, subject to the jealousy and suspicion of the Allied Council and of European politicians, chilled by much cold water thrown upon it by its own mother, America, several times proclaimed by some of her politicians as dead and scrapped, it cannot be denied that the League has proved its vitality and right to live.

The *Westminster Gazette* reports: "Its marked progress in the three years of its existence has been summed up as follows by Señor Augustin Edwards, Chilean Minister in London, who was President of the Third Assembly at Geneva last September:

"In its first year it was an impulsive child; its second year schooled it; and in its third year it has stepped as a peace-maker into the international arena.'"

Unless European civilization gets shipwrecked altogether through another World War, the League of Nations, with such a healthy infancy, has ahead of it a life of usefulness quite immeasurable, not simply in the basic, though negative, work of war prevention, but also in the more positive work of developing international law and promoting human progress generally.

The League will live. The United States cannot and ought not to kill it; it can and ought to strengthen it. In short, the League's greatest need is to complete the circle of its membership by including the United States.

And the United States needs the League as truly as the League needs the United States, as will be noted in particular in another chapter.

X. ALTERNATIVES TO "THE" LEAGUE

SUMMARY OF ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

In the last two chapters the answers to the objections alleged against the United States entering the League of Nations have been of four kinds:

1. These objections, when discussed on their merits, are found to have little or no real substance.
2. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that they have not been alleged by other nations.
3. The exceptional attitude of the United States is amply accounted for by exceptional political circumstances.
4. Three years' experience with the League negatives every objection alleged against it, including the objection that it could be used by the victors in the World War to oppress the vanquished nations, such as Germany and Austria.

ALTERNATIVES TO "THE" LEAGUE

But our task is not finished yet. The objector asks why enter "the" League when the present administration is committed to "an Association" and when several other substitutes have been proposed?

COURT VS. LEAGUE

Consider, then, on their merits, the possible alternatives to the League. We have already seen that the *Permanent Court of International Justice,* vital though it be, is not an alternative to the League but only a small part of it. A court settles but does not prevent disputes. Moreover it tells what the law is, not what it ought to be, which is usually more important. The Assembly will be the great developer of future international law.

CONFERENCES VS. LEAGUE

In the second place, *international conferences* do not constitute an alternative to the League. While useful adjuncts, they can never take the place of the League. A conference cannot act quickly enough. It has to be created first.

The League Council has met several times already on less than a week's notice to consider an emergency case.

It took five months for the Hughes Arms Conference to be created and assembled, but only nine days for the League Council to assemble and consider the invasion of Albania by the Jugo-Slavia State. It took three days to assemble in the Persia-Soviet Russia dispute.

It will be remembered that in 1914 anent the Austro-Serbian affair Sir Edward Grey tried to call a conference. But before he could get the other nations to assent to its being called the World War was upon us. The world had plenty of war machinery ready for prompt action but no such peace machinery. Had the League Council existed in 1914 the World War could scarcely have even started. One might as well depend on calling a conference to put out a fire instead of depending on an ever-ready fire department.

Moreover, as we have seen, individual nations hesitate very much to call conferences because of the responsibility they thereby incur. Recently the present administration opposed the Borah amendment to the Navy bill on this very ground. In fact, any nation not vitally involved will hesitate to call such a conference unless certain that it will succeed. The prestige of the nation calling a conference is imperilled. No such question is involved in a summons to

the Assembly, or Council, which is a sort of *continuous* conference.

A temporary conference, after it is over, leaves no organization behind to carry on. A continuous conference can keep on studying a question until its best solution is found. A temporary conference is necessarily hurried and must depend on such study as the participants happen previously to have made.

The Washington Conference was a splendid effort which every one hopes may still succeed. If it does succeed it merely proves the value of the League; for the League is a means of calling other occasional conferences. If a four-power pact is good to keep peace across the Pacific, is not a fifty-two-power pact better to keep peace across the Atlantic as well? If the Washington Conference filled a need, as it certainly did, it will be a recurring need. It would be absurd to claim that a few days' discussion in 1921 settled the whole question of naval disarmament for all time. Already there is a demand for another naval conference to discuss the smaller sea craft, which, not having been restricted in the provisions of the Washington Conference, threaten to develop into a major naval element. Naval competition in these

directions is already showing itself in Japan and elsewhere.

LAND DISARMAMENT REQUIRES CONTINUOUS CONFERENCE

It is well recognized that the question of *land* disarmament cannot be settled by such temporary conferences at all, because it is too complicated and too general to be soluble without long continuous study by one and the same organization. The League of Nations is making this study and is the only organization which has ever even made a serious beginning. And so difficult is the problem and so inextricably interwoven with all the other problems of international peace, that even the League has not yet brought its study to a successful conclusion.

All this is so important that it seems worth taking the space here to quote from Lord Robert Cecil, a leading authority on the League and a member of the League Assembly. His article is on "The Greatest Task of the League," published January 4, 1923, in the *Manchester Guardian Commercial* (in its great series of articles on "Reconstruction in Europe"). The article, it will be seen, illus-

trates clearly a number of other points already discussed in this book.

LORD ROBERT CECIL ON LAND DISARMAMENT

"The case for reduction of armaments is unanswerable. Economists demand it, humanitarians pray for it, and politicians perorate about it. No Government in Europe could stand for a month that avowed its hostility to a general reduction of armaments. But when it comes to proposals for reducing the armed forces of any particular country, a very different situation arises. National security is invoked, even the words quoted from the Covenant are relied upon. In every capital professions of the most pacific intentions are rife, but it is pointed out that until all nations disarm it would be quixotic for any one of them to do so. So that this strange result is reached: that in a time of unexampled financial difficulties, when everyone is agreed that economy is the most vital need of the day, the nations of the world are throwing away hundreds if not thousands of millions of pounds yearly because they are afraid of one another. Nor are they even mitigating their mutual fears by this waste of money. On the contrary, they are actually increasing them, and thereby also increasing that political disquiet which is the great enemy of the confidence necessary for economic recovery.

"The situation would be absurd if it were not so tragic. It is an international nightmare, made all the more fantastic by the fact that in every country

the great mass of the population earnestly desire peace.

"The formidable enemy of disarmament, indeed of peace, is not militarism but international suspicion. Until some means can be found of allaying that, it is useless to hope for any substantial reduction of armaments.

"The problem presents considerable difficulty. Suspicion breeds armaments, and armaments in turn breed suspicion. It is a typically vicious circle. Nations will never lay aside suspicion so long as their neighbors are armed; nor will they diminish their armaments until their suspicions have been allayed. Since, then, armaments and suspicion are interdependent, the only hope of diminishing either is simultaneously to attack both. Once this central factor of the problem is grasped, the conclusions arrived at by the last Assembly of the League of Nations are easy to follow. Thus, it was laid down, first, that 'any scheme for the reduction of armaments to be fully successful must be general.' The limiting words 'fully successful' were put in to meet the case of such countries as Norway and Sweden, whose geographical position secures them against the probability of attack. It may be that they will be willing to reduce their armaments without regard to the adoption of any general scheme.

"Next, it was resolved that 'in the present state of the world many Governments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their country.'

"Thirdly, it was agreed that such a guarantee

could be found 'in a defensive agreement, which should be open to all countries, binding them to provide immediate and effective assistance . . . in the event of one of them being attacked.

"And, lastly, the principle was accepted that consent to a reduction of armaments must be the first condition of the proposed treaty of guarantee.

"So far, all was more or less plain sailing. French fears were greatly soothed by the adoption of the principle that no reduction should be insisted on without some compensating guarantee of security. On the other hand, . . . in particular, the French urged that a mere agreement to guarantee was not sufficient, that, in fact, it went very little, if at all, beyond article 10 of the Covenant.

"To ask France to accept article 10 as sufficient protection against her haunting fear of future German invasion is to misunderstand the intensely practical mentality of Frenchmen. They will never be induced to reduce their own armaments in return for a moral guarantee.

"It seems, therefore, essential to the success of any scheme of disarmament that it should begin with a general treaty of guarantee agreed to by at least all the principal Western and Central Powers of Europe, and made conditional on the reduction of armaments.

"The problem is so refractory that it is not easy to see how it should be approached. Lord Esher in the proposals he made to the League tried a frontal attack. He took the force allowed to Austria under the peace treaties as the unit, and proposed a more or less arbitrarily fixed multiple of that for each of

the leading European countries. But the experts easily defeated him. They had a hundred technical reasons why that plan could not succeed. True, it was adapted from the Washington naval treaties, the greatest of all modern attempts at disarmament. But it was said, and no doubt truly, that naval reduction was for many reasons a far simpler problem. Units of a fleet are self-contained definite things of approximately equal value wherever they are found. But in an army the character of the country where it has to operate, the nature of its weapons, the training of its soldiers are factors of an importance equal or superior to mere numbers. So Lord Esher's proposal has had to be withdrawn, and nothing yet has taken its place."

Yet difficult as is this problem of land disarmament, it must be solved if world war is to be long averted, or even reduced in magnitude, and if, in peace-time, Europe is to be stabilized and prevented longer from wasting her substance in riotous armament.

To solve such a problem offhand in a few weeks' conference is out of the question.

"OUTLAWING WAR" AND "PEACE PARADES"

Even more inadequate than calling conferences is the project to "outlaw war" without backing up that sentiment by penalties or even by an organization. One might as well, as in

the early California days above referred to, pass a resolution outlawing murder and theft and expect an automatic obedience to the resolution. It might do some good, but would have little influence with desperadoes.

Similarly inadequate, though likewise praiseworthy in purpose, are the passing of resolutions and parading the streets with placards inscribed "no more war," or fraternizing through the Sulgrave Institute, or campaigning for "International Friendship through the Churches"; and no one realizes their inadequacy better than these organizations themselves.

For anyone to put undue confidence in these inadequate remedies is mischievous; for such efforts satisfy unthinking minds, while the "barriers" disappear as quickly as a fog bank when the gusts of passion arise.

One might as well parade the streets of New York with "no more robberies" placards and dispense with the police force or beat a tom-tom against smallpox and dispense with the Public Health office. To combat crime and disease public sentiment is ineffective without organization and the same is true of the public sentiment against war.

There is no intention of sneering at such efforts. They are good so far as they go.

They are first steps or foundation stones. The cultivation of a strong peace sentiment is a very essential preparation for an international organization to maintain peace and an equally essential force in making that organization function after it is established. But merely to create sentiment and do nothing more is the height of futility; for there will often be some states and people that will not conform to the sentiment—Turks for instance and Junkers, whether in or out of Germany.

As Roosevelt says, there must be a policeman back of the judge. Some ardent "pacifists" leave the "fist" out of the pacifist and think that the abolition of war is the abolition of force. It is the abolition of lawless force by the substitution of lawful restraint. This lawful restraint, while chiefly that of public opinion and economic pressure, has a small residuum of physical force. In short, some soldiers must continue not as soldiers but as policemen. Not all of the sword becomes the plough-share. Part becomes the policeman's club.

Enforcing peace is not, as some pacifists have thought and said, a "contradiction in terms." On the contrary the only peace mankind enjoys is a peace enforced as against its

disturbers and enforceable against its would-be disturbers.

If the whole idea of force is eliminated, the League will be immensely weakened and the injury thus done to it will some day have to be repaired; otherwise we shall pay dearly, in wars, for such pacifism. A forceless pacifism is no substitute for a league.

Thus far the League has had its success through public opinion, not through physical force. It did start creating an international police force for the Vilna territory, but decided not to use it.

Incidentally it may be remarked that America has until recently coöperated with the Allies in keeping a police force in Germany.

Nor has any actual use of the boycott yet been made, although the threat of a boycott has had a salutary influence in at least two cases. The Blockade Commission, after long labor, could not devise a practicable method of boycott.

The quick conferences of the League rely upon the waiting force of public opinion and that force is enough as long as the Great Powers are willing to respect it.

The League of Nations, then, or something very like it, is to be preferred to conferences

or to the Court alone or to mere outlawing of war or to other forms of pacifism.

"THE" LEAGUE VS. "A" LEAGUE

There only remains the question: Can we not replace "the" League by some other league such as the promised Harding world "Association?" Why should we? If we have a house to dwell in, why tear it down and build another? The proposal to do this merely has the effect of delaying our moving in.

We have waited more than two long years and there is certainly no new association yet in sight. There is no man in the United States to-day—from the President down—seriously advocating it.

Then, again, if such a substitute for the League is to be created, what is to become of the present League with its 52 members? No reasonable men can believe that the League will be so ready to disband and reorganize, especially as no good reason could be given for so doing.

Evidently the only practical way of creating a new League is by amendment of the existing League. The present League has power to amend the League Covenant to suit us, even to the extent of changing its name and rewrit-

ing every word, thus turning it into any kind of "Association of Nations" which may be really desired. If such amendment is really necessary to enable the United States to join, let us have it by all means and as soon as possible.

The conclusion seems inevitable that "the" League is the only league which the United States can join if it is to join any league at all—unless, as Mr. Justice Clarke jokingly suggests, we wish to form a rival league with Germany, Russia and Turkey.

SHALL WE ENTER UNRESERVEDLY?

Having reached the conclusion that the only reasonable course is to join "the" League, the only remaining question is as to reservations and amendments.

For myself, I can see no more reason why the United States should insist on reservations than any other of the 52 members of the League. When our own Constitution was formed 131 amendments were suggested by the eleven states which first ratified it. Yet they ratified without them. Why should we not do likewise?

There can be no doubt that the League Covenant should be, and will be, altered, from time to time, through the regular method provided

for amendments and under the supreme teacher, experience, precisely as our own Constitution has been amended nineteen times.

The only need of reservations is that of practical politics. If it is necessary to placate the Irreconcilables, in order to secure the number of votes necessary to put America into the League, such a compromise must, of course, be accepted. It would be better to be in the League with all the reservations ever suggested —even as an "Associate Member" (without any obligations) as has been suggested by Mr. Oscar Straus as one possible way to obtain the necessary consent—than not to be in the League at all.

At this point may be added another to the previous list of unanswered questions: Why does America not formulate the terms on which she would enter the League? Reservations were once formulated which, it was claimed, would have put us into the League if only the White House would assent. Then why not repeat those proposals, to-day? Or why not propose such a re-writing of the League Covenant as will convert the League into the "Association" promised in the 1920 Republican platform? Questions like these are being asked

by bewildered Europe to-day: "Why doesn't America say what she *does* want?"

It should be noted that to-day entrance into the League should be far easier than in 1920. As already emphasized, the League question is now divorced completely from the question of the Treaty of Versailles so that almost all the objections which voters then felt to the Treaty as an instrument for oppressing Germany, for keeping Shantung from China, for keeping Fiume from Italy, etc., have disappeared.

Our conclusion, then, is that America should join *the* League and give up trying to find some way of avoiding it, either by hunting for substitutes or by contriving amendments (except as political expediency may require). We should enter whole-heartedly and unreservedly, ready not only to reap the great benefits which will surely come to us, but to earn them by doing our share for our friends across the sea.

If some reader is still fearful lest, by entering, we commit ourselves too irrevocably to something we may regret, let him remember that we can always withdraw on two years' notice. Why not try it two years at least?

XI. UNCLE SAM'S EMPTY CHAIR

ISOLATION VS. PARTICIPATION

THERE seems, then, to be only one vital defect at the League's Council table—Uncle Sam's empty chair! The League will always lack strength as long as the strongest nation in the world is left out. We are halting the process of leaguing peace-groups together, by which alone civilization has displaced, or ever can displace, war. This evolution will never be complete until the whole world is joined together.

We hear people say that the United States should hold aloof until the European nations set their own houses in order, disband their armies, stop inflation and pay their debts. As Ivy Lee says: "This is easy to say but cannot be done by any nation acting alone." Then, says the imperturbable isolationist, let them first agree among themselves. But America is the most effective means of bringing about agreement. It was America which, during the war, created unity of action through the Su-

preme Council, in the appointment of Foch as Commander-in-Chief, as well as in putting Pershing under Foch. That is, we set the example of internationalism. The Allies remained united just as long as American interest in preserving this unity lasted. As soon as America withdrew from Europe, the old jealousies and quarrels in Europe broke out afresh. They *had* to, for there was no longer any impartial influence to keep the peace. Again we had set the example, but this time not of internationalism but of nationalism. If we keep on waiting for European nations to be united before we unite with them in any peace effort, there is grave danger that we shall wait until there is another world war. It was the spirit of selfish nationalism before 1914 that led to the war; it was the spirit of broad, sane internationalism that won the war; it was the reversion to the selfish nationalism after 1918 which brought war back in Europe, and it will be only by reverting once more, in the future, to the spirit of broad internationalism that we can maintain real peace. The peoples of Europe will listen to the voice of America because we are disinterested, as well as because we are great and because we hold Europe's destiny in the hollow of our hands.

HAVOC OF NATIONALISM

Even at the Paris Peace Conference the selfish nationalism of the Allies was held in leash with difficulty. They immediately asked, "What can we get out of the Treaty?" The fine idealism of the war almost vanished over night. And with the disillusionment which followed, the selfish scramble for spoils of war became even more intense and selfish. America alone stood out against this pressure. The League of Nations was the chief result of our effort for justice as against greed. Self-determination was also introduced as a principle in changing the map of Europe. But the new map could not be maintained without a united front of the Allies. Every nation which lost territory watched its chance to get it back. Its chance came when the united front was broken by the withdrawal of the United States which had been the chief uniting force. With the Allies thus demoralized and beginning to quarrel with each other, came the longed-for opportunity. Turkey is forcing her way back to Europe, Hungary is eager to break her narrowed bounds. The territory taken from the Turk and that taken from Hungary (and Aus-

tria) are two of the chief bones of contention in Europe.

FOUR GREAT MENACES TO PEACE

The two great problems just mentioned, those of Turkey and Hungary and the two other great problems, those of German Reparations and Russian Bolshevism, are the four menacing problems in Europe to-day. England and France disagree on at least three of these questions and need all the quieting influence which the presence of America at the European Council table could bring.

The Turkish-Greek situation, already resulting in the Smyrna tragedy, threatens the peace of Europe. Justice has had to yield to Force as it did in the Armenian massacres. In these the Armenians were more than decimated. Before the war the Armenians in Turkey numbered about 1,200,000. Over 700,000 were killed during the war. Of the 500,000 left at the Armistice half have already been killed or exiled and the present prospect is for a similar fate for the rest. Most of these terrible calamities to Christians at the hands of the Turks were due to the fact that France and England took opposite sides as between Greece and Turkey, while America held aloof, despite the

fact that the problem affected American citizens, property, schools and missions.

Mr. Justice Clarke says:

> "We literally brought into existence the new republics, Jugo-Slavia and Poland, and then withdrew and left them naked to their enemies. The almost insoluble difficulties between Poland and Lithuania are largely due, apparently, to the meddling of larger powers with ambitions of their own."

AMERICAN MODELS FOR EUROPE

We have the one great reservoir of experience with representative government and judicial procedure under free democratic institutions which should be daily and hourly available for infant republics taking their first steps in Europe. They need to be taught how to walk, as Cuba was, and we are the only logical teacher. The world is not yet safe for democracy. During the last two years methods of absolutism have returned and been strengthened in Russia, China, Italy, Greece, Turkey and somewhat in Germany and threaten to grow stronger. "The man on horseback" inevitably emerges out of long-continued chaos.

We are also the greatest reservoir of moral power, with ideals, political and social, more

unselfish than those of other countries and therefore can exert a special moral influence against the ill-concealed and little restrained European scramble for spoils. Our example in remitting the Boxer indemnity to China and in giving Cuba independence confers on us a special power for political policies of unselfishness, consideration and justice.

"Isolated" America is to-day closer to the hearts and hearts' desires of the *people* of Europe than any other country. Moreover, we have in our population representatives of every country in Europe and, reciprocally, we have some of our own people in most European countries. Even in Turkey our interest is great, for it is the United States which has the numerous schools and colleges, mission stations and orphanages in Turkey. So far as *human* interest in Turkey is concerned, ours is the greatest.

The principle of self-determination was invoked in order to remove causes of war. *In the long run* this removal will doubtless ensue. If the new map of Europe is once established (with some readjustments arrived at by arbitration) it can stay established. But the *first* effect of allowing, for instance, Alsace-Lorraine, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland to separate from

their former political bonds, however much the inhabitants of these countries may be pleased, is not a pleasant surgical operation on the countries from which they were cut away! While the scars thus made are healing there is need of strenuous efforts to keep the peace; for if peace is not preserved but the sores are exacerbated these sores may never heal at all. As a friend recently remarked, "look out for a thirty years' war in Europe."

America, both because she is disinterested and because she is the leading exponent of self-government, is the one country to relieve the situation.

OTHER OBJECT LESSONS

Similarly unfortunate and, partly at least, unnecessary is the quarrel between France and Germany who differ as to Reparations, leading to the invasion by France of the Ruhr. Apparently she is acting within her legal rights, and she certainly is entitled to every penny Germany can pay. But where will it end? Is the object really to get more indemnity or to get more security by seizing the seat of Germany's resources (because the requisite security was not supplied internationally)?

Will France succeed in extorting indemnity? If not, will she ever withdraw or will she keep the occupied territory indefinitely? Will her final action be justified before the world or will it turn to Vengeance and Injustice? And if Might triumphs over Right in Thrace and the Ruhr will Hungary follow suit? And when everybody in Europe gets back to the old game of grab what will become of the idea of justice planted in the League of Nations? Will a world war result? If so, will the United States be drawn in as before? We know that exhaustion does not prevent a nation going to war but sometimes only drives it all the more to desperation. We are far nearer war to-day than we seemed to be in the first half of 1914.

Already the League has been spoken of as the only means of solving the Turkish problem, or part of it, by putting the Dardanelles and Bosphorus under the League instead of under Turkey. So also the League has been looked to by Sweden and by the labor group in England to take up the Ruhr question. But both questions, that of the Turk and that of Reparations and the Ruhr, are too big for small nations to undertake when the big nations are at loggerheads.

IF AMERICA HAD STAYED

Had America's power for unity continued, through our presence in the League of Nations, the German Reparations might have been put on a practical basis and the Turks and Greeks both held in leash so that the Turkish problem would never have become acute. England and France would probably have kept up the spirit as well as the letter of their *entente cordiale,* the Genoa Conference would have been unnecessary, or had it been held, would have succeeded instead of failing. Everybody would have listened to America, victor and vanquished alike. Each country would feel itself facing a united world, frowning down their quarrel at the start, and holding over it the wholesome possibility of force if need be.

Moreover, France would never have kept so great an army if her dread of another German invasion could have been allayed by an assurance of Peace such as the presence of the United States in the League would have given.

If the German Reparation question had been settled in a practical manner according to the ideas not only of France but of English and American experts, Germany would not now have the good excuse of saying she cannot pay

all and be almost defying the Allies to make her pay *at* all, nor would France have been encouraged on her road of individualism and militarism. As soon as France felt that we had deserted her, she naturally prepared to build up her own means of defense. This drove Germany to ally herself with Russia in the Rapallo Treaty, which fact, in a vicious circle, made France feel even more the need of self-defense. And now her self-defense has, as so often happens, been transformed into offense and her entry into the Ruhr is uniting Germany within as well as tending to unite her with Russia without.

It stands to reason that America would have contributed elements of strength and impartiality to the League which could not have failed to work in the direction of Peace. They would certainly not have worked in the direction of war.

WHAT SENATORS NELSON AND BORAH SAY

Let us see what two of the foremost Republican Senators now have to say. Senator Nelson, when speaking recently against the recall of our troops from Germany, said:

> "I may be a heretic, Mr. President, but I have always believed that it was the greatest mistake,

economically and every other way, for America that we did not enter the League of Nations, with one or two amendments to the covenant.

"If we had become a part of the League of Nations, we would have stabilized conditions over there. Political conditions must be stabilized before economic conditions can be stabilized, and I am satisfied in my own mind, though I may be called a heretic, that if we had entered the League of Nations . . . conditions would have been far better in Europe than they are to-day.

"There are some features of the League of Nations of which I did not approve, but we could have eliminated them. In its main features, however, it would have acted upon the conditions of Europe just as our little army to-day over there on the Rhine acts upon the foreign soldiers. It would have stabilized conditions there and the economic difficulty under which Europe is suffering to-day would have been far less than it is now.

"They all look to America. As a result of the war, a large share of the money of the world came to this country. We were the wealthy country. We were the strong, the rich country and we attained such a position in the war that if we had been a member of the League of Nations, if Uncle Sam had shaken his head to the powers of Europe, our advice would have been taken, and we would have controlled the whole situation.

"This may be a sort of funeral oration on the days of the past, and yet I felt then as I feel now that the greatest mistake in the world was that we did not adopt that treaty of peace, with some amend-

ments, particularly as to Article X and others. If we had done that, conditions in the world to-day would have been much better than they are now.

"I do not like this peanut politics about what a great danger it is to leave a thousand American soldiers over there in Europe, what a horrible thing it is to leave a thousand model soldiers over there to stabilize conditions."

Senator Borah said:

"For more than two years there has been a deadlock on the question of reparations. It has become so serious as to threaten complete estrangement between leading nations which were together in the war. It has brought Europe to the very verge of economic chaos. It has even in the minds of men in high official positions in different countries made another conflict imminent. Naval and military men are now advocating greater navies and larger armies because of serious threatening conditions abroad. The problem is here. If it is not adjusted, it will mean greater suffering in Europe and cost loss to our producers, and it may mean another war. If the worst should come, we might be going to Europe on another mission than that of conferring. I repeat, the only question is, How can we help—what is the best method? Upon that I have an open mind."

WHAT JUSTICE CLARKE SAYS

"The critics of the League, especially at Washington, condemn it because it has not been able in-

stantly to restore peace and millennial quiet to Europe and especially because it did not settle the war between Greece and Turkey and did not prevent the invasion of the Ruhr by France.

"The League was designed to deal with conditions after the World War was ended, but that war has never been ended by a ratified treaty of peace with Turkey. The League is not an agency to enforce the Versailles treaty and for this reason it has not shared in attempted settlements of reparations to be paid by Germany—when these are otherwise settled the function of the League will begin. It has no jurisdiction over either case and therefore did not act. Germany and Turkey are not members of the League.

"The only way in which action on the part of the League in either of these cases could be invoked would be by representation of some member nation that conditions in the Ruhr or in Turkey threaten to disturb international peace and therefore constitute a matter of concern to the whole League, and since all the great powers in the League believed they were doing, outside the League, all that was possible, no such call was made on it to act.

"But if the United States, disinterested, powerful and trusted, because of our service in the war, had been a member of the League of Nations, there is every reason for confidence that with the aid of the neutral nations of Europe and South America the resources of this new agency of peace would have found some way out."

"ENTANGLING ALLIANCES"

But, say the isolationists, we have always been taught to avoid "entangling alliances."

But the League is not an "alliance." An "alliance" is always directed *against* some nation or nations. The Allies in the World War were united against Germany. (We were in their alliance, by the way, although we carefully avoided the word and called ourselves not an Ally but an "Associated Power.") The League is not such an alliance at all. It is a society of nations, for mutual peace among all its members, not against any outside nation, even Germany, and some day Germany herself and every other nation will be a member and there will be no outside nation.

ONE LEAGUE OR SEVERAL ALLIANCES

Without central machinery to keep the peace the tendency is for nations to form groups for mutual protection, as instanced by the Triple Alliance and the Entente, so that a continent becomes divided into two hostile camps. Aggression by even a small power at once involves the Continent in war. Many believe that the next great war will be racial in origin and they urge that the Western Nations can only

preserve Western civilization by a great Alliance against the Asiatic peoples whose expansion is referred to as the "Yellow Peril." On the other hand, there is a rumor of united action by Eastern peoples under the defensive slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics." It seems obvious that a central council in which black, yellow and white are represented is a powerful agent to dissipate race hatred; to curb purely racial ambitions; and most of all to prevent certain Western Nations from stirring up racial or religious hatreds, to their own advantage.

An alliance between an Eastern or yellow nation and a Western or Christian State is peculiarly offensive to other "White" nations. So the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was, perhaps without justification, a cause of great irritation to Americans. The abandonment of this Alliance at the Washington Conference, at which white and yellow were represented, is but an indication of what may be accomplished in this respect.

Nor is the League "entangling." Rather is it, as Wilson and Taft both said, *dis*entangling. Our *non*membership is much more likely to entangle us more. Our isolation in 1914 did not save us from entanglement in the World War. Our isolation after 1920 did not save us from

entanglement over the disposition of the Island of Yap, but produced it and necessitated a Four Power Pact, which is much more truly an alliance than the League of Nations. Our isolation in the future will not save us from entanglements but will infallibly produce them.

Mr. Justice Clarke has said:

> "The statesmanship is blind that does not see that Russia and Germany united in misery would be a menace to our social order not less than to that of Western Europe. In their exhaustion, Britain and France could not stand against it and what would our prospects become with Russia triumphant to the Atlantic and bent on the conversion of the world! It may be too late in two years more to prevent this unholy union, but with America in the League, Germany would eagerly enter it and the danger would be past. Here is sufficient reason, if there were no other, for our joining the League.
>
> "A nation responsible for the government of the Philippine Islands; for the maintenance and protection of the Panama Canal; for the safety of many thousands of miles of coast line; for the protection of a great commerce on every sea; and for the policy of the 'open door' in China, Asia and Africa, cannot possibly live in isolation."

GEORGE WASHINGTON

But, pursues the doubter, would George Washington not have disapproved of the

League of Nations? He certainly would not have thought of it as one of the alliances to which he referred in his Farewell Address and he never even used the phrase "entangling alliances" commonly attributed to him; the phrase was Jefferson's.

Washington contemplated a weak America and a strong Europe. Had Washington lived to-day he would have seen, instead, a strong America and a weak Europe. Most important of all he would have seen the whole world drawn together, shrunk, as it were—ocean and land bridged by steam and the earth encircled by electricity. Then news traveled no faster than people; now a cable goes around the world and back to the starting point in less than five minutes and we are beginning to talk across the Atlantic.

How can any sane person allege, under such circumstances, that the man who, more than any other, brought about a close union of the thirteen colonies (called at the time "a league of friendship"), would to-day oppose a very loose union of nations? Or would fear to let our nation, now the strongest in the world, enter where no other nation in the world sees anything to fear?

CONCLUSION

Of course we do not wish to send troops to Europe to settle petty troubles there. But we had to prepare to send 2,000,000 of them once and are now headed straight toward another situation in which we may have to do the same thing, perhaps before children already born are out of their teens.

If any real reason for sending troops comes, we shall have to send them anyway. But as Ivy Lee says:

> "When we sit there with our spirit of unselfishness, with the known record we have for sympathy and generosity, most of the troubles will be settled without war. We can induce peoples to reduce their standing armies, we can induce them to compose their differences, we can induce them to look with a little more tolerance upon their neighbors. Nine hundred and ninety-nine cases in a thousand, of all conceivable disputes which might involve our sending troops to Europe will be settled by the very fact that we are sitting in conference, that we are giving our views, our unprejudiced and impartial opinion, as to what ought to be done."

In short, it is better to send a few police troops, like those we have had on the Rhine, to keep order, than a thousand times as many to fight in a world war.

Clearly the isolation method of keeping the peace used by Abram and Lot is impossible for America to-day. There is no longer any opportunity for nations to separate and keep out of each other's way. There is but one effective method now available, that of the League of Nations.

XII. THE PRESENT OUTLOOK

EUROPE DEPLETED

BOTH Europe and America have lost grievously because of our isolation. Europe has scarcely begun rehabilitation for three chief reasons:

(1) Much of the energies of the nations are diverted to self-defense because they lack the feeling of security which would have come had America contributed her great moral influence. Thus a French worker cannot work in rebuilding his country if he is drafted into the army. If America were in the League, he might be at work on Reconstruction.

(2) Before Continental Europe can recuperate she needs to wipe from the slate all unpayable debts. Only America, the creditor of the rest of the world, has enough power and impartiality to work out a sane revision.

(3) Before Europe can recuperate she needs advances of raw materials and capital generally; and these the producers and investors of the United States alone are in a position to provide.

Europe is in the position of an individual who has suffered from a four years' illness, during which he has gone into debt. Naturally, when his illness is over he cannot repay his loan at once. On the contrary, he must borrow even more in order to tide him over the period of repairing his premises and tools, preparatory to resuming his old rate of production.


UNBALANCED BUDGETS AND EXCHANGES

We have at least two economic indicators which infallibly show that European nations in general are in no condition to pay but, on the contrary, are in the very condition which requires them to borrow. These are the fall in their exchanges and the fundamental fact behind that fall, namely, that their governments cannot make both ends meet. According to figures collected sometime ago by the League of Nations, Austria raised by taxes only 15 per cent of what she spent. So she paid her bills by printing more money and so her money and exchange fell. Hungary also raised 15 per cent; Greece, 17 per cent; Poland, 26 per cent; Belgium, 27 per cent; Germany, 33 per cent; France, 45 per cent; Italy, 59 per cent.

Apparently no European government, except possibly England's, has yet balanced its budget.

Cost of the World War

compared with
the Cost of All the Wars in the World
from 1793 (beginning of Napoleonic Wars) to 1910



What will "the next war" cost?

(From "The Next War" by Will Irwin. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York)

*

Europe is thus, year by year, sinking deeper in the mire of debt, inflation and despair.

We in the United States have peace, security and plenty. Europe has none of these. We lack imagination when we picture Europe as recovering from the war, as we are recovering.

The one hope lies in the League of Nations. It was with this thought that Leon Bourgeois has recently resigned the presidency of the French Senate (just as our own Justice Clarke resigned from the Supreme Court of the United States) in order to devote the rest of his life to the League of Nations.

AMERICAN HELP HELPS AMERICA

Economic help from America, i.e., the extension of credit to Europe (say through private investors), will not injure but benefit the United States! A wise creditor will keep on extending credit to a crippled but potentially capable debtor until he has gotten him on his feet. Otherwise the creditor will never get his pay. In sane business dealings a creditor does not refuse to go on the committee to safeguard the assets of the debtor. France's ability to pay us is conditioned on the value, as an asset, of German Reparations; and yet we talk of

calling home even our unofficial observer on the Reparations Commission.

In short, we should, from sheer motives of self-interest, if we are no longer capable of altruism, help Europe economically to help herself and we shall benefit economically in the end.

EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS BANKRUPT, NOT EUROPE

If the matter were sanely handled economically the rapid recovery of Europe would be possible. *Europe* itself is not bankrupt but only her *governments*. The actual economic destruction of capital wrought by the war is far smaller than most people imagine. The land remains almost unimpaired; for the devastated area is a negligible fraction of Europe—only a fraction of one per cent. The same may be said of equipment—ships, factories, machinery, etc., except of those forms which wear out rapidly. So far as labor is concerned, while enormous numbers of men have been killed or have died of disease, their very destruction has simplified, rather than complicated, the problem of supporting the remaining population; for it has lessened the number of mouths to feed and bodies to clothe and shelter. The truth is that the productive *capacity* of Europe

—land, equipment, labor and organizing ability —is, as Professor Moulton of the Institute of Economics has emphasized, almost as adequate as before the war.

And yet, with the exception of a few localities, Europe is not recovering! On the contrary she is steadily sinking like a man caught in the quicksands. How are we to explain this paradox?

In a word, the explanation is *maladjustment.* It is not a question of recovering assets lost by the war but of readjusting conditions of peace. There is not sufficient security and incentive for government, production and investment; there are too many government liabilities in proportion to assets; and specific kinds of essential raw materials and equipment are lacking. Every business man knows that business success often depends only on a delicately balanced adjustment. If Ford's assembling plant lacks the tires, or the spokes, the whole series of processes are thrown out of gear. So, for instance, Germany with cotton operatives and machinery has lacked cotton.

We may also illustrate this paradox (of inadequate production in spite of adequate productive capacity) and at the same time illustrate the diagnosis (of maladjustment in the three

ways above mentioned) by reference to the case of government debts. Government debts, internal and external, interallied and reparation, constitute the hugest *economic* problem in the world to-day. But this problem is far different from the popular idea of it. Most people imagine that by paying these debts the world will thereby pay the cost of the war. This is altogether wrong. The *world* has already paid every cent of war cost represented by these colossal debts! The payment was made when the shells which were bought with the proceeds of the original loans, exploded and when the soldiers' rations and clothing were used up. All these war costs were defrayed during the war and (what is the important point) *mostly out of income, not capital.*

Those who bore the cost were, in general, those who advanced the loans—for instance, in the United States, the subscribers to Liberty Bonds. What the debts signify is simply the obligation to reimburse now these people who paid then. They do not mean a liability for the world as a whole. Every dollar of debt paid *by* the world is also paid *to* the world. It is not a payment *out* of the world as were the original shell explosions. That sort of payment ended on November 11, 1918; and whatever dam-

age was then done to property is not repaired by the mere transfer of money to-day from taxpayers to bondholders. Reconstruction is a separate operation.

In fact, to a large extent, the debtors and creditors are identically the same persons. Those who hold Liberty Bonds are largely those who must pay the taxes for extinguishing those bonds.

LIMITS TO GOVERNMENT CAPACITY TO COLLECT AND PAY

Yet even were every individual equally a debtor and creditor the very hugeness of the debts would make them unmanageable. There would still be maladjustment. To show this clearly and to bring it home to ourselves, imagine our government in debt comparably to the governments of Europe, say to the extent of 100 billions of dollars. Suppose further that the Liberty Bonds were equally distributed so that every man, woman and child in the United States held a thousand dollar bond. Finally, suppose a tax of $1,000 per capita were levied for wiping out this debt.

Evidently everybody owes $1,000 in taxes and is owed $1,000 for his bond, and both could be taken care of if everybody would con-

sider himself as owing himself $1,000 and would simply tear up his own bond.

But what would really happen would be very, very different, simply because of the fact that the *Government* enters as a collecting and disbursing agency. Each individual would hug his bond and hate his tax. He would not think of his bond as a claim upon himself but upon the United States; nor of his tax as a payment to himself but to the United States. Even our strong government could not collect any such huge tax nor would it dare even to propose it. Any administration which did so would be thrown out of office at the next opportunity; for the tax required would be out of proportion to the per capita wealth and out of keeping with experience. That is, there would be maladjustment. What we would do under such circumstances, if they ever should occur, is exactly what Europe is doing, tax as far as we could and pay the rest by printing paper money.

In short, there are limits to the tax-extracting capacity and the debt-paying capacity of any Government even when the two items theoretically cancel for every individual under that Government.

Still more impossible is the situation when there is no equality between each person's debit

and credit, especially when it turns out that the poor are to be taxed to reimburse the rich. Still more impossible is the situation when the citizens of one country have to be taxed to repay those of a foreign country, especially when it turns out that the poor countries of Europe must reimburse rich America. Finally, still more impossible is the situation when the foreign country to whom the tribute must be paid is a hated enemy conqueror.

Under such circumstances the debtor Governments, such as Germany, are, in actual fact, insolvent. Excepting England, not one of them can, in any practical sense, raise and pay interest on its debts.

Yet there are two Governments to-day which cherish the illusion that these huge debts can and therefore must be paid in full, the United States and France. France cannot pay us in full, unless Germany pays her and is, in fact, sinking deeper into debt. And the idea of Germany paying in full is the most ridiculous of all. As Otto Kahn says:

> "While all the Allied nations together, victorious and augmented, find themselves unable to pay us an aggregate of ten billion dollars within twenty-five years, yet the Governments of these same nations, last year, committed themselves to the stipu-

lation that Germany alone, defeated and diminished, is capable and obligated to pay to them more than three times that sum, i.e., thirty-two billion dollars, *in addition to several hundred million dollars annually for the cost of their armies of occupation.*"

UNBALANCED BUDGETS' EVIL EFFECTS

This example of maladjustment has been dwelt on not only because it is so little realized and not only because it is the greatest overshadowing economic problem in the world to-day, but also because its understanding will help us realize that what is ordinarily thought of as a hopeless problem is really quite soluble. *If all inter-government debts could, by some magic wand, be canceled and all the other great government liabilities left by the war, such as pensions and military expenses, could likewise be abolished, Europe would recover with astonishing rapidity because her productive capacity is adequate. But with government debts, pensions and military expenses as they are, recovery is impossible.* The governments simply cannot raise the taxes required to cover these expenditures and have to resort to the printing press.

But this only makes matters worse; for the resulting depreciation and uncertainty of money

makes more maladjustments. It makes all business a gamble and all saving a mockery, wipes out the middle class of "rentiers" and salaried men, robs the wage earner of over half his earnings, impairs his health, discourages legitimate enterprise, ruins credit, and, as a consequence of these and other demoralizations, reduces production. With production reduced it becomes still harder to raise revenue by taxation, it becomes more necessary than ever to inflate, production is still further reduced and so the economic degeneration goes on and on in a vicious circle.

Government loans can seldom be resorted to to break this vicious circle because government credit is shaken. And when they are resorted to, as by France, the evil day is merely postponed and the final catastrophe magnified.

BRAILSFORD'S ILLUSTRATIONS

To illustrate this round of evils by citing simply one of the minor harms being done I will quote the Englishman, H. N. Brailsford, writing January 4, 1923, on "The Survival of German Civilization" in the *Manchester Guardian Commercial,* in the series of articles on the Reconstruction of Europe already cited. Speaking of a doctor in Budapest who had

shown himself to be a keen observer of Central Europe, he says:

"I will not attempt to reproduce the whole of his [the Budapest doctor's] answer, which was worthy of his acute, theoretical intellect. The part of it which haunts my memory still, ran somewhat thus: 'I can reconcile myself to a struggle which may be fatal to culture, as you and I know it and value it, because I believe that it is already destroyed. Culture survives, if you will, in Central Europe in the sense that its monuments and records are still preserved. The books, the music scores, the pictures are still on the library shelves and on the walls of the museums. The discoveries of physical science are still on record. But the small leisured class which created our arts and our science, preserved our traditions of refinement, and furnished the audiences which rewarded and appreciated the musicians, the painters, the poets and the philosophers has already gone under. Culture cannot live without a class which (as the German expression runs) is its "carrier." It was never a large class. It consisted in prewar days not of the rich, but of the educated men and women of moderate means, for whom a secure, if small, inherited income from land or investments purchased the leisure for intellectual pursuits. That class in Central Europe has been destroyed.'

"He went on to overwhelm me with illustrations from among his own circle of friends. 'Did you know the work of X? (I did not.) Well, he was quite the most promising of the younger German

poets. He had a small landed estate, and used to live in moderate comfort from his investments. Now he and his wife must work the farm with their own hands. You can guess how much poetry he writes. He is leading an ordinary peasant life. Then there is Y. (you met him in my Commissariat in Budapest), certainly our ablest metaphysician—his theories somewhat resemble Bertrand Russell's. I met him yesterday. He had just accepted a post as clerk in a cinema, at 40,000 kronen (then about £1) a month. He is the lucky one among my friends. As for Z., and ——, but I need give no more illustrations. They are all starving; I have just enough to keep myself alive—nothing for clothes, or books, or music. I need a copy of Hegel's "Logic" urgently for my work. It is my Bible. I used to read it daily. But I cannot buy even a second-hand copy. No, culture is already destroyed. We who had grown to maturity before the war, remember what it was. Our children—but few of us will have children.'

"My own experiences during the next month, some of them among old friends, were to confirm Dr. L——'s gloomy picture. The educated class in Germany and Austria is sinking, as Einstein put it recently, to a proletarian level. The whole middle-class, with the exception of the few big bankers, the captains of industry, and the hated new rich who thrive by speculation, is so much in the same plight that everyone talks frankly of his difficulties. One hostess talked of the mere physical difficulty of keeping clean, since hot water consumes the costly fuel. A father spoke tragically of an

expected child. A professor lamented the impossibility of obtaining a certain book, costing the equivalent of ten shillings, which was indispensable for his lectures. Everyone knows the broad fact that wages and salaries rise in Germany much more slowly than prices. The unskilled laborer is not far below his pre-war standard: the skilled worker has retrograded more seriously, but it is the professional man, the teacher, and the civil servant whose standards have been lowered so seriously that they are only just perceptibly above those of the artisan, while artists have suffered most seriously of all.

"Municipal officials, in showing me the statistics for the schools of their towns, pointed out that the percentage of undernourished children, arrived at by medical examination with the same tests and standards, was actually higher in the middle-class than in the working-class schools, and some comparative examinations of clothing and boots in Münich and Berlin had even shown that the middle-class children were the worse clad. Indeed, I doubt whether the middle-class is really better off in any respect, save that it had a bigger stock of pre-war comforts and that the drastic Rent Restriction Act enables it still to live, at a nominal charge, in its relatively spacious dwellings.

"An investigation into the condition of the panel doctors of Berlin (summarized in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of November 21) gives a vivid picture of the condition of the professional classes. Out of 3,000 doctors nearly half (1,368) were earning in the quarter from April to June an income of less than 10,000 marks quarterly, which at the rate of

exchange then prevailing would mean an annual income of £25. For a man in this position the purchase of a new instrument, even a cheap and simple one, would eat up a quarter's income.

"My friend Dr. L—— did not exaggerate. Culture, in the sense of an activity which creates and conquers new fields, is dying, because the leisured class itself is sinking to a proletarian level. The one limit to this process which one can certainly see is that while industry survives, it must keep at least some departments of science and some corps of chemists, electricians and engineers alive."

HOW AMERICA COULD HELP

The vicious circle described above cannot be broken until the expenses of governments are reduced enough to make possible a balanced budget. America's entrance into the League of Nations would enable the countries to get rid of military expenditures by making peace more secure. It would open the way for an impartial expert study of the debt problem, including that of Reparations, and of all the other problems and, what is more important, through her sane and impartial influence, the solution found would at least have a chance of being accepted.

What the solution may be is not to be given off hand. But America is the key as Germany is the lock; for we are the world's great creditor as she the world's great debtor. The other

countries are brokers to collect of Germany and pay us. Thus France says if Germany pays her in full she will pay us in full. But this is impossible. Why, then, should we not let up on France if France will let up on Germany? Both relaxations are bound to happen anyway. Why not graciously instead of with ill feeling all around? Especially pertinent is such a question when we discover ourselves obstructing payment to ourselves! When we speak in terms of *money* we demand payment in full. But when we translate the payment into *goods* we put up our tariff wall against them! (Of course a money payment is impossible and, were it possible, would merely add eleven billion dollars to our present plethora of gold and inflate our cost of living.) Since, then, we shall obstruct repayment anyway, why not remit part of it and aid Europe in other ways, all on condition of the needed reforms in Europe—disarmament, balancing budgets, stoppage of inflation, etc.—just as the League of Nations has done on a smaller scale in reference to Austria and Albania?

As things are, the more France puts the screws on Germany the less Germany can and will pay. It is the old story, transferred to the sphere of states, of imprisoning a bankrupt

debtor instead of accepting ten or twenty cents on the dollar. The result is Germany's budget shows still huger deficits, her inflation increases, the mark falls, the exports from America are the more hindered, the selling of paper marks abroad becomes even more of a swindle, and no one gains, Germany least of all. While her real creditors are losing what little they might get out of the wreck, the wreck is being bought up by private speculators in England and America. These will soon be the real owners of Germany while France is "holding the bag."

As things are, we know, on the one hand, that, with the present top-heavy debts, the governments simply cannot balance their budgets, while we know equally well that, by sufficient readjustments, they could do so. It is merely a question of economic engineering requiring (1) a new and practical schedule and (2) the putting of that schedule into effect. Whether or not America could fully succeed in accomplishing these two results, we may be certain of one thing—that without America there is little chance of their accomplishment.

In short, the model for solving these problems which come from *overburdening weak governments by impossible liabilities* is the treatment of Austria by the League of Nations.

Otherwise, what is likely to happen is repudiation with all the ill feeling it engenders and revolution with all the demoralization which we have witnessed in Russia. These, with famine, pestilence and war are beginning to show their grim forms through the mists which, perhaps mercifully, hide the future from our eyes. Even with America in the League the outlook is dark enough; but without America, the outlook is literally the darkness of the Middle Ages.

AMERICA NEEDS EUROPEAN MARKETS

Moreover, Europe's poverty means less power to buy of us. Our farmer wants a foreign market. In short, we should, from sheer motives of self-interest, help Europe economically to help herself so that we may ourselves benefit economically in the end, to say nothing of avoiding being drawn into war. It is to our interest to prevent either France or Germany from the catastrophes which follow from a government bankruptcy. Confusion, chaos, militarism, idleness and other forms of economic waste follow, all of which spell dwindling power to trade with America. Our farmers need the French, German, Russian and other

markets now doomed apparently to be impaired or lost.

The economic conference held at Brussels in September, 1920, under the League of Nations resolved that:

> "The first condition for the resumption of international trade is the restoration of real peace, the conclusion of the wars which are still being waged, and the assured maintenance of peace for the future. The continuance of the atmosphere of war and of preparations for war is fatal to the development of that mutual trust which is essential to the resumption of normal trading relations. The security of internal conditions is scarcely less important, as foreign trade cannot prosper in a country whose internal conditions do not inspire confidence."

What Herbert Hoover said, in a speech on October 3, 1919, merely anticipated what is happening now.

> "We are an overseas people and we are dependent upon Europe for market for the surplus products of our farmers and laborers. Without order in Europe we will at best have business depression, unemployment and all their train of trouble. With renewed disorganization in Europe, social disease and anarchy thrive, and we are infected by every social disease that blows from Europe. We are forced to interest ourselves in the affairs of the world if we are to thrive."

Former Governor Lowden in a recent address before the Foreign Relations Council spoke as a farmer. He said, as the New York *Times* expressed it:

> "The price that we should have to pay ought to be taken into the reckoning: 30 per cent of our wheat fields reverting to an untilled state; 20 per cent of our corn fields no longer producing corn because there would be no market abroad for it, and 50 per cent of our cotton fields going back to forest and log; the closing up of some of our copper mines, and the complete revolution of our industry and commerce."

Why, then, does not the American investor lend money more liberally to Europe? Simply because he lacks confidence. He needs security. And without peace and balanced budgets in Europe he never can feel the requisite confidence and receive the requisite security. In short, we do not freely invest in Europe for the same reason that we do not freely invest in Mexico. Life and property are not safe enough.

So great, however, is the need and so high are the bids for our capital that speculative investors *do* invest and lend. Mr. Hoover says four billion dollars have been so advanced to Europe besides a billion given in charity and

that "if we had not done so the Continent would have sunk into chaos long before this." As it is, the Continent *is* sinking into chaos before our eyes, reverting to the Dark Ages! What we have lent is as nothing to what we could have profitably lent and invested, if it had been safe and were used for reconstruction instead of being wasted in munitions, war and otherwise.

American business will adjust itself even if Europe be swallowed up into an abyss. But we shall be a big loser thereby. Business is recovering from the various blows it has received, including the blow to our international trade dealt us by our own refusal to enter the League. But business needs safety and we are not safe from further blows. We may be said to be living on the edge of a volcano. Every morning we scan the newspaper in dread lest Europe should be blowing up a second time.

WE HAVE LOST GOOD WILL

While Europe is in this plight we are like the Priest and the Levite passing by on the other side and so losing the opportunity to render one of the greatest services in history. We are also losing our own greatest asset as a nation—international good-will. We once seemed the savior of Europe; now we appear

as her unfeeling, unintelligent creditor, if not an international bully. Were we not the richest nation on earth, the 52 other nations already members would probably put us in the same category with old Prussia. Eventually, in fact, if Europe recovers without us we may find instead of a League of Nations of mutual goodwill a new balance of power, the United States versus the rest of the world, with competition in armaments and eventual war.

In short, we are witnessing—and by our aloofness intensifying—one of the greatest tragedies of all time, the deterioration of Western civilization politically, economically, ethically. And all this while even self-interest is calling us to do our duty!

Even more evidently is it to our interest to help Europe maintain peace, lest we again be drawn into a world war. Moreover, the latter object of keeping peace is a prerequisite of the former object of economic advantage in finance, trade and agriculture.

IMPOSING ON UNCLE SAM

Some timid souls seem to fear that if the United States enters the League we shall be burdened with all the expenses and obligations, while Europe will enjoy all the benefits. (Ap-

parently we are now trying—albeit unsuccessfully—to get all the benefits and assume none of the obligations!)

As a matter of fact, such fears are groundless. The League is not a charity organization society. On the contrary, it helps to do away with the need of charity. By membership in the League we should escape much of the need which we now find of sending our billions over to relieve Europe; for Europe would need less charitable relief. Had we been in the League we would not now have to feed the horde of Near East Refugees. Our help to Europe would be the help which a banker can give and profit by. We seem in this country to forget that both parties gain in a normal trade or business transaction.

Aside from the not yet realized hope that the Hughes Arms Conference will bear fruit (in naval disarmament and guaranteeing peace in the Pacific), the only tangible participation yet achieved by America in world peace efforts since the Armistice is in membership ("unofficially") in some of the League's minor bureaus, notably that for preventing traffic in women and children and that for controlling the opium traffic, the Anthrax Commission of the International Labor Office, and the Hydro-

graphic Office, and in sending "unofficial" observers to the Reparation Commission and the Geneva and Lausanne Conferences.

Several Americans like Mr. Arthur Sweetser and Mr. Royal Meeker are members of the Secretariat and the International Labor Office and an American, Justice John Bassett Moore, is on the International Court of Justice, but not in any way through action by the United States.

In the actual choices of personnel and in the actual policies of the League we have as yet no voice whatever. When recently at Lausanne our observer attempted to speak, the Turk quite properly objected to such an interloper having any voice in the proceedings.

Our great Uncle Sam is, as Mr. Everett Colby has said, put in the undignified position of merely hanging around the doorsteps of the League and peeking in at the windows while not allowed to share in its real work. As Oscar Straus says, when we sent out doughboys abroad it was not as unofficial observers. They saved Europe then but not by unofficially observing; and the hour is fast approaching when we shall feel the same urge to save Europe again. We shall not do this by unofficially observing her in her death struggle. As Ivy Lee well says:

"We can trifle no longer. If we wait too long, it may be too late. Civilization is on fire, and yet we, a great Christian people, sit unmoved. We blame the other fellow for it all."

If the signs of the times do not deceive us the people of the United States are becoming restless over this anomalous situation and disapprove of the attitude of the isolationists in the Senate. In fact, one of the most significant of these signs is the changed attitude of some of these isolationists themselves.

Even to those who insist on misinterpreting the election of 1920 and to claim that America is thereby committed not to enter the League, it is to-day apparent that the United States is sick of isolation and is trying to find a way to participate in Europe's problems. The way lies open. The empty chair awaits us.

THE PRESENT PRO-LEAGUE MOVEMENT

There are many evidences that a new movement away from isolation and toward a policy of participation is fast gaining momentum. In January, 1922, the Agricultural Conference at Washington resolved:

"Whereas the surplus production of many products of American farms have long found and now

find their main market in European countries now large public debtors to the United States,

"Resolved, That this conference therefore urges the administration to use its good offices and its commanding position as a creditor country to aid in the industrial rehabilitation of Europe.

"We trust that it may not seem inconsistent with prudent policies of state for the United States at the proper time to participate in a conference for economic and financial reconstruction in Europe, to the end that we may counsel with the principal customers for our products concerning their present difficulties and future needs; that they may understand our situation; that we may understand theirs; and that we may ascertain what we may expediently do, within the limitations of our Constitution and our established American policies, to accommodate them and ourselves through sound credit arrangements by international financial institutions or otherwise."

The American Bankers' Association has called upon the Administration to state the terms on which it proposes to help rehabilitate Europe. At their convention last October attended by 11,000 bankers they went on record:

"We believe that the time has come for the government of our country to formulate the principles on which it will be able to coöperate with the other nations to bring about the needed rehabilitation of European countries and peace in the world."

The American Federation of Labor and other labor bodies have passed similar resolutions.

Another body passed the following resolution with only three dissenting votes:

> "Resolved: That we, the members of the New York State League of Women Voters, beg the President and Congress of the United States to take immediately the first measures for the entry of the United States into full membership of the League of Nations, the only existent, permanent and functioning agency for international coöperation and world peace."

Senator Lodge was all but defeated for reelection because of dissatisfaction with his foreign policy among thousands of pro-League Republicans.

The only real obstacle lies, as we have seen, in the Senate.

There seem to be just now only two possible ways to extricate ourselves from this Senate snag:

(1) The Administration to take the initiative and ask for popular support.

(2) Public opinion to be educated up to taking the initiative and demanding action both of the Administration and the Senate.

Very regrettably, I think, the first seems definitely to have been abandoned (although, just as this book goes to press, there are some signs to the contrary, in reference to the proposal to enter the League's Court).

The second is apparently the only method open to us at present.

The church organizations have been doing important work and receiving a remarkably cordial response.

The greatest pro-League movement is that of the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association, formed by uniting the forces of the numerous prior organizations in the one simple program of entering the League of Nations on such terms as can be obtained. The President is former Justice John H. Clarke and the President of the Council is Hon. George W. Wickersham, Attorney-General under the Taft Administration. That this new movement is appealing to America everywhere is shown in countless ways. For instance, in Baltimore, a clergyman told his congregation of about 275 persons that he was joining the movement and invited those who wished to join with him to tell him after the service. The number who took the trouble to do this was 145!

Such straws, of which there are many, seem to indicate at least that the wind is blowing away from the "little American" policy of isolation.

XIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

WHAT, then, do we find? After waiting since the Armistice, through a longer period than the period of the war, we are still debating what to do, while 52 other nations are doing it. The dream of the ages, the Parliament of Man, has come, with a seat of honor made for us. But, instead of taking it, we picket the premises with unofficial observers. And all this despite the fact that the League grew out of the efforts of our own great men, including especially our last three presidents.

But now we are beginning to realize that isolation cannot last; that it hurts ourselves as well as Europe; that we are losing our best markets and our chances to be repaid the debts; that we are frustrating such disarmament on the land as we endeavored so hard to bring about on the sea; that the task we undertook in 1917-18 to bring peace to Europe has not been finished; that while we are fiddling the world is burning; and that we are living on the brink of a volcano.

What *shall* we do? What else is open to us except the League? And why should we try so hard to avoid the obvious thing to do? We have seen that the objections urged against our joining will not bear examination; that no other nation was deterred by them; that they were only excuses for not joining the League, not the real reasons; that the number of people who took them seriously is far smaller than was thought; that to-day the League and the Treaty are not only separate but separated; that the League is not an instrument for enforcing the Treaty but, on the contrary, the only hope of remedying the Treaty; that if the Irreconcilables could be reconciled there would be no lack of public sentiment to support them; that, in the end, our joining the League is manifest destiny; and that, if this is to be done before we are entangled in another world war, there is no time to lose.

To be specific, the United States should enter the League for many reasons of self-interest, namely,

(1) to keep a foreign market for our farmers and manufacturers;

(2) to enable Europe to pay some of its debts to the United States;

(3) to maintain our greatest international asset, international good-will;

(4) to avoid the need of a costly navy and army;


(5) to avoid wars which would injure and probably involve ourselves.

THE ALTERNATIVES

The last reason is the biggest one; although, in a distorted perspective, it seems so far off as to be the smallest. We need the League to escape world war. We have our simple choice, League or War.

If we choose the League, we in America can have peace and prosperity through the ages. The other alternative is too horrible to contemplate. So, since the Armistice, we have tried to close our eyes to the nightmare of which we had just begun to get a glimpse. Will Irwin in "The Next War" has revived the picture for us. Yet, even so, we see it more dimly than Europe. Otherwise our people, like the people of Europe, would clamor so insistently for escape from that nightmare that no band of Irreconcilables would venture to stand in the way.

Loss of Soldier Lives in Recent Wars



*This figure is only an estimate. The reported loss of American lives was 2426. Figures showing loss of Spanish soldiers have not been found.

(From "The Next War" by Will Irwin. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York.)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

THE LAST WAR

What did the war cost? Its *money* cost to Governments was 186 billion dollars, to which might be added the billions spent during the generation preceding the war in preparing for it. This does not count the billions of dollars' worth of devastation in France and Belgium, and on the sea—the destruction of ships, factories, railroads, mines, soil—nor the intangible costs of disrupting trade and industry.

In *human lives* it cost 10 millions killed. This does not include the 30 millions of civilians "who might be living to-day."

In *morale* it cost respect for law and decency, a widespread demoralization from which the world probably cannot recover in a generation.

In the *vigor of the next generation* it cost untold health, the natural birthright of millions of children, including the "Armistice babies" born nine months after the return from the war of exhausted soldiers to exhausted wives.

In *racial vigor* it cost the best potential parenthood of Europe. As David Starr Jordan has so truly insisted, this, the greatest war cost, reveals itself generations after the war is over.

The Napoleonic Wars shortened the stature of the French race by killing off so many tall soldiers whose height would have been inherited had they lived to have children. So also the World War has killed off the healthiest, strongest, bravest and most intelligent young men of Europe—medically selected for slaughter.

THE NEXT WAR

And "the next war" will probably cost more in every one of these ways. In that war not soldiers only but helpless women and children will be asphyxiated by the newly invented gas bombs to be dropped from the sky. Whole cities, like New York, will have their inhabitants put to death by this method and its buildings set on fire by other gas devices. The next world war means the suicide of the world!

This is not the kind of a nightmare that we have in our dreams. It is a nightmare of broad daylight. It simply represents the hard cold facts of modern warfare as thus far developed without any guessing as to further developments which future military science has surely in store for a world so blind as to countenance war.

It is more and more difficult to localize

"The Next War"



Courtesy of Capper's Weekly.

"The Chemical Warfare Service has discovered a liquid poison so strong that three drops will kill anyone whose skin it touches. . . . Falling like rain from nozzles attached to airplanes, the liquid would kill everything in the aircraft's path."

—New York *Times*, March 13, 1921.

"The use of poisonous gas at the end of the world war was a child's game compared to what it will be in the future."

—BRIG.-GENERAL A. B. FRIES, Chemical Warfare Division, U. S. Army.

(After the Disarmament Education Committee, 629 G St. N.W., Washington, D. C.)

Children in "the Next War"



This mother and these children of France were required to wear their gas masks at all times during the latter part of the World War.

Not only gas masks, but whole suits of gas-proof clothing will be necessary for our women and children, long distances from the front, if there is another war.

(After the Disarmament Education Committee, 629 G St. N.W., Washington, D. C.)

modern war. We found in the last war that New York was almost as near Serbia as was Vienna. A distinguished American clergyman recently said:

> "It is a mighty serious business when anyone talks of war between the United States and Japan, because two minutes after the first gun has been fired the whole East would be in the war, and everybody knows that that means that all the rest of the world would soon be in it."

To destroy war has become a necessity. No other interest can be allowed to hold it back. "Either civilization must destroy war or war will destroy civilization." One of these alternatives leads us through the League of Nations to a world of peace, justice and prosperity. The other leads us through war to a world of death and destruction. Which shall it be? League or War?

ALTRUISM

It may be observed that, throughout this book, chiefly reasons of national self-interest have been advanced why America should enter the League. Little has been said of altruism; for it seems that the high plane on which President Wilson argued for the League misled many into thinking that our entry meant further and needless sacrifices just as we were fondly

thinking that all the sacrifices were over. This book has been written largely to help correct the impression that to enter the League would, or could, injure the United States and to show that, on the contrary, it would benefit us immensely. Nevertheless, I would be ashamed to conclude this book without saying, with emphasis, that America owes it not only to herself but to our late allies, to humanity, and to the ideals for which we have stood since 1776, to go over and help them and thus to finish the work we began, that of making the world safe for democracy.

We may well shudder at the cynicism of one politician who said: "The people are more interested in their stomachs than in the heart of the world." If our boys at Château Thierry had been more interested in their stomachs than in the heart of the world, they would have turned and fled. They wiped away that very reproach which had been hurled at us during the three long weary years (1914-17), when England and France did the fighting for us and kept back the Germans at the cost of millions of lives and billions of treasure; and now that they are exhausted because they defended us, we are asked to desert them as a bankrupt concern!

Colonel House recently said of Europe:

> "The feeling is general that America has shirked her responsibilities and has deserted the world at a critical time and for selfish reasons. Some feel a grim satisfaction in the conviction that if Europe goes down America will go with her, no matter how hard she tries to hold aloof. At the unveiling of the statue of the great, humane and universally beloved Lincoln, Premier Lloyd George gave voice to the feeling lying deep in the hearts of all when he said: 'This torn and bleeding earth is calling to-day for the America of Abraham Lincoln.'"

Kipling has been quoted—misquoted he explains, but the misquotation expresses a feeling often encountered—that "America has lost its soul."

But America is not half so selfish as she is made to appear. We have not forgotten that almost all of our ancestors came here from Europe. We have not forgotten what we owe to the Huguenots, the Germans of the Rhineland and the Scotch-Irish; we have not forgotten Lafayette and Von Steuben.

If there be any Americans who would blink our duty to our friends across the sea, let them remember that we owe the same duty to the memory of our brave boys who laid down their lives. They did this not simply to save our

skins, much less to safeguard our property. They made their supreme sacrifice with the noble idealism of youth going blithely to their death while we told them they were fighting a war to end war.

The mother of one of these heroes, who now sleeps in Flanders Fields, recently said sadly: "At one time I believed I was reconciled; for I thought he and his comrades had conquered war. But perhaps, after all, he died in vain."

People are asking now what *did* we fight for? Have we gained it? Recently we buried an Unknown Soldier with national honors. The only monument worthy of the work he and his comrades did is a structure which will not only commemorate but perpetuate their work, a structure of human brotherhood, to bring Peace on Earth and Good-Will toward men,—the League of Nations.

A year ago, at Belleau Wood, near Château Thierry, I stood in the gloaming among the wooden crosses in the little American Cemetery where lie the bodies of the boys who first routed the Germans. For it was there that the Germans first realized the resistless force of America. The doughboys had pushed the enemy back a few miles. The Germans started to en-

trench themselves, expecting the Americans to entrench and rest as the French were accustomed to under like circumstances. But, to their surprise, the doughboys renewed the attack and repulsed them again several miles. Again the Germans started to entrench and again the Americans pursued them, until the German retreat turned into a rout. That was the beginning of the end. It was then that the Germans began to realize what a resistless force lay behind these first troops of ours.

No one can stand on that sacred ground without thinking thoughts and dreaming dreams. Had our boys really won what they fought for? They had kept the faith with us. Have we kept the faith with them?

Who can bear to play politics over these graves? Are these wooden crosses our last tribute or shall we finish the Great Monument we began?

APPENDIX

TEXT OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT

COMPLETE TEXT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT

[In all important cases the United States has a veto power, i.e.: The vote of the Council or Assembly, to be effective, must be unanimous *except in the few unimportant cases indicated by italics.*

The separate points in each article are numbered in brackets to assist the reader in quickly verifying the statements made in the A B C of the Covenant which follows the text of the Covenant.]

ORGANIZATION

PURPOSE

The High Contracting Parties, in order to promote international coöperation and to achieve international peace and security

[1] by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

[2] by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations,

[3] by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and

[4] by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

APPENDIX

MEMBERSHIP

Article 1. [1] The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

ANNEX. One. Original Members of the League of Nations Signatories of the Treaty of Peace. United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, British Empire: Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India; China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Czecho-Slovakia, Uruguay.

States Invited to Accede to the Covenant. Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela.

Two. First Secretary General of the League of Nations. The Honorable Sir James Eric Drummond, K.C.M.G., C.B.

[2] Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by *two-thirds of the Assembly,* provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such

regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

[3] Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

[Also, Article 26 below provides that failure to accept an amendment to the Covenant automatically terminates membership in the League of Nations.]

THE ASSEMBLY

Article 2. The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

Article 3. [1] The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League.

[2] The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

[3] The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

[4] At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.

THE COUNCIL

Article 4. [1] The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated

Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be members of the Council.

[2] With the approval of *the majority of the Assembly,* the Council may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be members of the Council; the Council with *like approval* may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.

[3] The Council shall meet from time to time, as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

[4] Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.

[5] At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative.

Article 5. [1] Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant, or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly

or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

[2] All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, *shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.*

[3] The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

THE SECRETARIAT

Article 6. [1] The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such secretaries and staff as may be required.

[2] The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex [Sir James Eric Drummond]; thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with the *approval of the majority of the Assembly.*

[3] The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the Council.

[4] The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.

[5] The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

Article 7. [1] The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.

[2] The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere.

[3] All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.

[4] Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

[5] The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.

AGREEMENTS INTENDED TO PREVENT AND SETTLE DISPUTES

REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

Article 8. [1] The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

[2] The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

[3] Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

[4] After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein

fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

[5] The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections.

[6] The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

[7] The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programs and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.

Article 9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

Article 10. [1] The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.

[2] In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article 11. [1] Any war or threat of war,

whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall, on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

[2] It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

Article 12. [1] The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.

[2] In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

Article 13. [1] The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled

by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration.

[2] Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration.

[3] For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the Court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

[4] The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered,

[5] and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith.

[6] In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

COURT OF JUSTICE

Article 14. [1] The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice.

[2] The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it.

[3] The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

APPENDIX

SETTLING DISPUTES BETWEEN MEMBERS

Article 15. [1] If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council.

[2] Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

[3] For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

[4] The Council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

[5] If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council *either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute* and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

[6] *Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.*

[7] If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed

to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

[8] If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, *other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute,* the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

[9] If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

[10] The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly.

[11] The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

[12] In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly,

[13] provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of *a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the*

parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof *other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.*

PUNISHING COVENANT BREAKERS

Article 16. [1] Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League,

[2] which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations,

[3] the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State,

[4] and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State,

[5] whether a Member of the League or not.

[6] It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force, the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

[7] The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures,

[8] and that they will mutually support one another

in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State,

[9] and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

[10] Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a *vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.*

SETTLING DISPUTES INVOLVING NON-MEMBERS

Article 17. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League,

[1] the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just.

[2] If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

[3] Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

[4] If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a

Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

[5] If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

TREATIES AND MONROE DOCTRINE

Article 18. Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League, shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

Article 19. The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

Article 20. [1] The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof,

[2] and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

[3] In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this

Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

Article 21. [1] Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

MISCELLANEOUS

MANDATORIES

Article 22. [1] To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

[2] The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

[3] The character of the mandate must differ ac-

cording to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

[4] Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

[5] Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

[6] There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory subject to the safeguards abovementioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

[7] In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

[8] The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

[9] A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

GENERAL WELFARE

Article 23. Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League:

(a) will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations;

(b) will undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control;

(c) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;

(d) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with

the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;

(e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind;

(f) will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

Article 24. [1] There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent.

[2] All such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.

[3] In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

[4] The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.

Article 25. The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and coöpera-

tion of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

AMENDMENTS

Article 26. [1] Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by *a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly.*

[2] No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

The
A B C
of the
Paris Covenant
for a
LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BY

WILLIAM H. SHORT
Secretary of League to Enforce Peace

IN CONFERENCE WITH

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Published
[*before the League had become a political question*]
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THE A B C OF THE PARIS COVENANT

I. The Aim: The Paris Covenant provides for a voluntary League of civilized nations, which shall undertake to promote the justice and preserve the peace of the world by accepting obligations not to resort to war, but to deal openly, justly, and honorably with one another, by scrupulously maintaining the sanctity of treaties, by firmly establishing the rules of international law as the rule of conduct between governments, and by establishing close coöperation in matters of common concern.

It does not assume to be able to end war, any more than governments assume to be able to end crime. But as governments reduce crime by settling disputes peaceably, by punishing crime when it is committed, and by organizing society in the general interest; so the League of Nations aims to reduce war by settling disputes peaceably, by penalizing the nation that begins war contrary to the covenant of the League, and by an administration of matters of common concern in the interest of the people of the whole world.

II. The Covenant: *To accomplish these purposes, the members of the League agree that they will—*

Respect and Preserve the Political Independence and Territorial Integrity of each member against external aggression. [Article 10.]

Submit Disputes to Arbitration by a tribunal administering international law or to mediation by the Council or the Assembly provided for in the treaty, and furnish a statement of the case to the Secretary General of the League. [Article 12, No. 1.]

Abstain from War against any member until the dispute has been submitted to arbitration or mediation, and until three months after the award or recommendation; and even then not go to war with a member of the League that complies with the award of the tribunal or with the unanimous recommendation of the Council or Assembly. [Article 12.]

Carry Out in Good Faith any awards that may be rendered whenever the parties to the dispute voluntarily agree to arbitrate. [Article 13, No. 4.]

Boycott any Nation that goes to war contrary to the covenants of the League, support one another in economic measures necessary to make the boycott effective, support one another in resisting any special measure aimed at one of their number by the offending state, and afford passage through their territory to the forces of League members operating against the offending nation. [Article 16, No. 4.]

Exchange Information concerning military and naval programs and industries adaptable to warlike purposes, and for stated periods not exceeding ten years, unless relieved of the obligation by the Council, observe limitations of armament when voluntarily adopted by each of them on recommendation of the Council. [Article 8, No. 7.]

Secure Fair and Humane Treatment for Labor, as far as practicable, at home and in all countries with which they trade. [Article 23 (a).]

Secure Just Treatment, so far as possible, for native inhabitants of territories under their control. [Article 23 (b).]

Entrust the League with Supervision over the execution of international agreements providing for the suppression of the white slave traffic and the sale of dangerous drugs, and with the supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition in countries where the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest. [Article 23 (d).]

Maintain Freedom of Transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of members. [Article 23 (e).]

Co-operate in Measures for the prevention and control of disease. [Article 23 (f).]

Encourage and Promote Organization and work of the Red Cross. [Article 25.]

Establish International Bureaus to administer such matters of common interest as may be agreed upon. [Article 23 (a) *et al.*]

Abrogate all treaties and obligations among themselves inconsistent with the Covenant and enter into no such obligations in the future. [Article 20.]

Register all New Treaties, which shall not be binding until so registered. [Article 18.]

Pay a Due Share of the expenses of administering the affairs of the League. [Article 6, No. 5.]

III. The Agencies: *The Covenant provides the following agencies to advise and assist in carrying out these agreements—*

An Assembly which shall represent all member nations, determine by majority vote its own procedure, and meet at stated intervals and as occasion requires.

Each member of the League may have three delegates but only one vote. The Assembly shall make its decisions by unanimous vote except as otherwise provided, and shall have power to—

"Deal With" (that is, discuss, and, no doubt, express opinions concerning) **All Matters** within the sphere of action of the League, or affecting the peace of the world. [Article 3, No. 3.]

Advise the Reconsideration of Treaties which have become inapplicable, or of international conditions dangerous to peace. [Article 19.]

Select the Four [now six] Non-Permanent Members to the Council, in succession to Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and Spain temporarily appointed by vote of the Paris Conference pending action by the Assembly. [Article 4, No. 1.]

Admit New Members to the League by two-thirds vote. [Article 1, No. 2.]

Inquire into Disputes referred to it by the Council or the parties to the dispute and by majority vote make recommendations which, if concurred in by the votes of all the States represented in the Council, exclusive in each case of the parties to the dispute, will protect from attack the States complying with them. [Article 15, No. 13.]

A Council of nine [now eleven] which by majority vote shall determine its own procedure and meet at least once each year, each member having one vote as follows: representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and of the following four nations designated by the Peace Conference to serve until the Assembly shall appoint their successors

—Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain.[1] The Council shall have power, by unanimous vote, to—

Expel a Member that has violated any covenant of the League.[2] [Article 16, No. 10.]

Formulate Plans for the reduction of armaments for the consideration of the several governments, such plans to be subject to revision at least every ten years. [Article 8, No. 2.]

Advise How the Evils attendant upon the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war may be obviated. [Article 8, No. 6.]

Advise Upon the Means of preserving the territorial integrity and political independence of the members against external aggression, whether actual or threatened. [Article 10, No. 2.]

Propose What Shall be Done to give effect to the decision, if a state fails to carry out the award of an arbitration by which it has agreed to abide. [Article 13, No. 6.]

Formulate Plans for a permanent Court of International Justice. [Article 14.]

Inquire into Disputes not within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, and not submitted to the court or to arbitration or to the Assembly; endeavor to secure a settlement by mediation and, failing this, make a recommendation which, if unanimous, protects

[1] The Council may, by unanimous vote of its own members and a majority vote of the Assembly, increase its permanent membership. By similar procedure it may increase the number to be selected by the Assembly.

[2] The vote of the covenant-breaking nation, if a member of the Council, would be ignored in determining unanimity of action.

the state complying with it from attack. [Article 15, No. 7.]

Recommend What Military and Naval Forces shall be contributed by each member to protect the covenants of the League against a nation that resorts to war contrary thereto. [Article 16, No. 6.]

Inquire into, and Offer Facilities for, the settlement of disputes with or between non-member states and, in case of refusal by the non-member state or states to accept such offer, make recommendations and, if necessary, take action to prevent hostilities and settle the dispute. [Article 17.]

Fix the Terms of a Mandate, by a nation willing to accept it, over any colony or territory formerly governed by Germany or Turkey, whenever this has not been previously agreed upon by the members of the League. [Article 22, No. 8.]

Appoint the Secretary General, subject to confirmation by majority vote of the Assembly, and confirm his subordinates. [Article 6, No. 2.]

Appoint Permanent International Commissions and control international bureaus. [Articles 9, 22, 24.]

Supervise the Execution of Agreements to suppress the white slave trade and the traffic in dangerous drugs. [Article 23 (c).]

A Secretary General, and his subordinates, chosen by the Council for administrative work. [Article 6, No. 2.]

A Court of International Justice to be established in accordance with plans to be worked out by the Council, with power to decide any dispute referred to it by the parties thereto, and to give an advisory

opinion upon any matter referred to it by Council or Assembly. [Article 14.]

A Mandatory Commission to oversee and advise respecting the administration of colonies and backward peoples formerly governed by Germany or Turkey. [Article 22, No. 9.]

A Permanent Commission to advise on military and naval questions. [Article 9.]

International Bureaus for the regulation of matters of international interest; existing international bureaus such as the International Postal Union to come under the League's direction when the parties to the treaties creating them so agree, and all international bureaus hereafter created to come automatically under the League's direction. [Article 24.]

IV. Guiding Principles: *The Covenant formulates the following principles for the guidance of League members and administrative agencies—*

That the Validity of International Engagements for the maintenance of peace such as the Monroe Doctrine and treaties of arbitration shall not be affected by the covenant. [Article 21.]

That War or Threat of War anywhere is the concern of the League, since war, like fire, is liable to spread; and the members of the League may take action to safeguard the peace of nations. [Article 11.]

That Making War contrary to the covenants of the League shall be deemed an act of war on the part of the offending nation against all other members of the League. [Article 16, No. 1.]

That Maintenance of Peace requires reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national

safety and the enforcement of international obligations. [Article 8.]

That Submission of Any Dispute to mediation by the Council can be effected by either party thereto by giving notice of its existence to the Secretary General. [Article 15, No. 2.]

That Each Member of the League shall have the right and responsibility of calling the attention of the League to anything that threatens to disturb peace and good understanding among nations. [Article 11, No. 2.]

That Publication of the Facts of all Disputes that threaten war and are not settled by arbitration shall be made, so far as expedient, whether or not unanimous recommendation of an award is reached. [Article 15, No. 5.]

That the Well-Being and Development of Backward Peoples residing in colonies of the Central Empires, or in territories taken from them, is a sacred trust, and that they shall be administered by nations acting as agents or mandatories of the League: a principal consideration in the selection of such mandatories being the wishes of the peoples in the areas to be administered. [Article 22, No. 1.]

That All Positions in connection with the League shall be open equally to men and women. [Article 7, No. 3.]

V. The Limitations: *Things the Paris Covenant does NOT do.*

Does **not** create a super-government outranking those of member states or maintaining armies to overawe them; but is a treaty in which the members pledge themselves to maintain a condition of inter-

national morality akin to that maintained by every civilized State within its own borders.

Does **not** commit members to obligations they cannot get out of. A nation may withdraw from membership on two years' notice, if its international and League obligations have been fulfilled, just as a partner may withdraw from a partnership.

Does **not** place the United States in a position where it can be coerced by the vote of other nations in the Council or the Assembly, as the power of these bodies is almost wholly advisory and even for this a unanimous vote is required on all vital matters.

Does **not** involve the calling out of American soldiers in case of local squabbles in the Balkans or elsewhere. While members of the League are obliged to take part in a boycott against a nation that attacks another member contrary to the league covenant, they do not otherwise agree to join in making war.

Does **not** place peace above justice, but PROVIDES for war as a last resort to restrain an aggressive nation and does not forbid war against a nation that refuses to accept the awards of League tribunals and in case of disputes where no decision can be reached by the Council or Assembly.

Does **not** prevent the division or union of existing nations, but keeps open every means of effecting changes in national boundaries except by external aggression.

Does **not** affect the constitutional authority of Congress to declare war, although Congress will be morally bound by this treaty, as by every other. The Council can RECOMMEND war but only Congress can DECLARE war.

Does **not** destroy the Monroe Doctrine. On the contrary, the Monroe Doctrine for the first time in history is expressly recognized by all the members of the League, and its principle extended to the world by means of the provision that the territorial integrity and political independence of all the members shall be preserved.

Does **not** interfere in the domestic affairs of any nation. That also is expressly provided against. The League has no right to interfere with revolutions, rebellions, immigration, tariffs and other internal problems of its members, although it may take notice of them and make recommendations when such matters threaten the peace of the world.

Does **not** exceed the treaty power under the Constitution. The United States has during its history entered into treaties involving all the powers affected by the covenant.

VI. Membership: *The Covenant provides the following rules for membership in the League:*

Charter Membership is open to the following signatories to the Treaty of Peace: United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, British Empire, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India, China, Cuba, Czecho-Slovakia, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Serbia, Siam, Uruguay; and to the following states which are invited to accede to the covenant: Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela.

Other Self-Governing States, Dominions or

Colonies may be admitted to the League provided they give "effective guarantees" of sincerity and accept such regulations regarding military and naval armaments as may be prescribed by the League.

VII. Location.

The seat of the League shall be at Geneva unless changed by the Council.

VIII. Approval, Ratification and Amendment.

This Covenant in its original form was unanimously approved by representatives of fourteen nations at the Peace Conference, was then referred to the peoples of the world for criticism and suggestion and revised in the light of this discussion. It includes all the material amendments requested by the people of the United States. In its final form, it is now referred to the governments of the nations for adoption. When ratified, it can be amended by the unanimous vote of the nations represented in the Council and a majority of the nations represented in the Assembly.

No amendment, however, shall bind any member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case the dissenting state would cease to be a member of the League.

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